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1

Introduction
A Time to Build Up—The Birth of the NMA
A feature in the February 7, 1970 issue of The Black Panther, the weekly newspaper of the
Black Panther Party (BPP), described numerous examples of what the Party deemed “Health Care –
Pig Style.”1 One such example was the story of a man who showed up at the emergency room
window and requested medical care for a knife wound: “He was told to sit down and wait his turn.
Two hours later a nurse discovered him slumped in his chair, with a four-inch knife in his back.” The
article concluded that “our people are dying from medical miscare—we must all work to make the
People’s Health Clinics a reality.” The clinics in question were a new endeavor for the Party. The
BPP was expanding its “Survival Programs,” which already included programs to provide free
breakfast, groceries, and clothing, to include healthcare via the establishment of the People’s Free
Medical Clinics (PFMCs).
The inspiration for the Panthers’ clinics was predicated on not just a frustration with the
racism perpetrated upon Black patients by the established medical system, but an outright rejection
of its undergirding philosophy.2 The BPP recognized that Black Americans suffered
disproportionately from preventable diseases and experienced worse health outcomes than their
White counterparts and the PFCMs were, in part, a response to that reality. However, the Party also
saw that the system in which patients could prevent illness, became ill, and sought care was itself
inherently flawed. The system to which the Panther’s objected was the result of a century’s worth of
conflict over how and to what degree the medical field ought to be managed.
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Sociologist Paul Starr, an early authority on the “social transformation of American
medicine,” argues that the profession secured its sovereignty by the early twentieth century.
Physicians began to secure their own sovereignty at that time by establishing themselves as
purveyors of a service that was exempt from consumer scrutiny.3 By the 1950s, their knowledge was
seen as privileged beyond the comprehension of the average patient and physicians enjoyed a high
level of deference as a result.
Historian Nancy Tomes expands Starr’s narrative to include what she deems the “remaking
of the American patient.” Tomes argues that understanding the patient as a consumer, particularly
during the post-war rise of consumerism in America, can link the health disparities to the overall rise
of economic inequality.4 As medicine grew increasingly expensive, access to it, just like other
commodities, became stratified on the basis of wealth.5
This narrative, like most others, establishes physicians as members of an elite class—a fair
assertion given that most of them were White, wealthy, and, until the 1960s, members of a
profession that was highly trusted. But Black physicians did not fit into that characterization with
ease. Within their race, they were an elite minority; within their profession, they were an irrelevant
minority, subject to much of the same discrimination as other Black Americans. This placed Black
physicians at the tense convergence of two narratives: one of race, and one of professionalism. The
BPP’s decision to open the PFMCs in the early 1970s indicated a response to the inability of Black
physicians to adequately navigate this tension. To the party’s eyes, Black physicians had, by that
point, joined the ruling class. However, this was not always the case.
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Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a
Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 230.
4
Nancy Tomes, “Merchants of Health: Medicine and Consumer Culture in the United States, 1900-1940,” The Journal
of American History 88, no. 2 (2001): 524, https://doi.org/10.2307/2675104.
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Lizabeth Cohen, “A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America,” Journal of
Consumer Research 31, no. 1 (June 2004): 238, https://doi.org/10.1086/383439.
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In the fall of 1895, twelve Black physicians gathered in Atlanta, Georgia during the Cotton
States and International Exposition to hold the inaugural meeting of the National Medical
Association (NMA). The organization was to serve as a separate professional society for Black
physicians as a direct result of their exclusion from the larger and increasingly powerful American
Medical Association (AMA). Almost as soon as the NMA had been created, Black physicians found
themselves at the entanglement of two tightly strung warp threads of the social atmosphere.6 The
resonant tension existed at the intersection of race and professionalism as the men of the NMA
struggled to serve the needs of their race and their interests as members of an elite, sovereign class of
professionals.7 The question became not how Black society would develop with or in the presence of
White society in the era of the “separate but equal doctrine” affirmed in the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson
ruling, but specifically how the Black physicians would navigate the intersection of their two
identities which often conflicted with one another.
The first thread within which Black physicians had become entangled was Jim Crow. Black
patients in the Jim Crow south were generally able to seek treatment at new, separate and unequal
hospitals. Even this marked an improvement from the previous model in which slaves received
treatment in rudimentary slave hospitals to which physicians attended only in the most serious of
circumstances. The Freedman’s Bureau provided little assistance post-Civil War. The early
racialized understanding of disease and germs gave White physicians reason to establish segregated
facilities at which Black patients could be treated, thus hopefully containing the spread of their
disease to the White population. While Black patients received inferior treatment than their White
counterparts, Black physicians enjoyed few of the privileges of their fellow professionals. White
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Warp threads are the stationary longitudinal threads on a loom that serve as a foundation through which one weaves the
transverse weft threads; Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 83.
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hospitals often barred access to Black physicians and of those that did not, some mandated that
White physicians supervise the practice of their Black colleagues.8
The second thread was the consolidation and organization of medical professional authority.
Although the profession could not be characterized as a monolith, a growing trend to affirm the
prestige and sovereignty of the profession amongst those engaged in mainstream styles of practice
resulted in a widespread endorsement of licensing and credentialing to denigrate those practicing
homeopathy or practicing without a “proper” education. The founding of the AMA in 1847 served
this interest—its members adopted a code of ethics denying professional courtesy to “irregular
practitioners” and became a vocal proponent of regulating the practice of medicine via licensing.9
The AMA altered its structure in 1901 so that it made decisions by a vote of its House of Delegates,
the members of which represented smaller state medical societies.10 The new structure empowered
the AMA’s national body the ability to speak on behalf of the nation’s physicians—of whom 50
percent were AMA members by 1910. But it also allowed them to charter more local medical
societies and assert influence over state politics.
Starr emphasizes the degree to which White physicians’ efforts consolidate power also
yielded a newfound level of professional sovereignty. Increasingly, the AMA could regulate the
terms of the patient-physician interaction, from how much to charge to which patients to see. A
cynic might say that they did so for the purposes of personal gain; a benevolent reader might trust
that the terms of engagement established by doctors also yielded the best results for patients. But
according to both explanations, physicians came out ahead.11
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Vanessa Northington Gamble, Making a Place for Ourselves: The Black Hospital Movement, 1920-1945 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 7-8.
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As the AMA consolidated power, racial segregation resulted in the exclusion of the nation’s
900 Black physicians from that consolidation.12 It was in direct response to this exclusion that the
NMA was founded. The tension at very core of the NMA’s being and this paper is how they would
balance their privilege with their power to affect change. To be excellent “race men,” to use the
language of the era, Black physicians would have to use their status as members of a small
exceptional subsect of the race to elevate the less fortunate among them. To be excellent medical
professionals, they would have to leverage their relative power for the benefit of their profession.
They could not be both “race men” and professionals first.
Although the founding members of the NMA met just a month after Dr. Booker T.
Washington’s famed “Atlanta Compromise” speech at the same Cotton States Exposition, there is
little more than circumstantial evidence creating a causal link between the two events. Washington
had argued that his race “shall prosper in proportion as we learn to dignify and glorify common
labor, and put brains and skill into the common occupations of life.” He claimed that economic
success, not integration, would provide a fruitful path forward for the Black race. Washington
preached a model of racial advancement in which the White and Black races remained “as separate
as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.” He argued that Black
Americans ought not avoid employment in manual labor or agriculture for such labor was a
necessary component in constructing a society. “No race can prosper till it learns that there is as
much dignity in tilling a field as in writing a poem. It is at the bottom of life we must begin, and not
at the top,” Washington said.13

12

Gamble, Making a Place for Ourselves, 11.
Booker T. Washington, “Speech to the Atlanta Cotton States and International Exposition,” September 18, 1895,
American Radio Works, http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/blackspeech/btwashington.html.
13

6
While the twelve founding members of the NMA were not “at the top,” they were certainly
not at the bottom of the social order either. Dr. Robert F. Boyd, the NMA’s first president was a
renowned physician and a successful politician; Dr. Daniel H. Williams, the NMA’s first vice
president performed the first ever successful heart surgery in 1893.14 The timing of Washington’s
speech may have had no causal connection to the founding of the NMA, but the coincidence of the
two events occurred in response to increasing discrimination against Black Americans in the Jim
Crow south.
Despite the temporal proximity of the NMA’s founding and Washington’s speech, the
organization more closely aligned with the philosophy of William Edward Burghardt Du Bois. Du
Bois outlined his philosophy in a brief 1903 essay titled, “The Talented Tenth,” in which he
proposed achieving social advancement by way of the race’s best and brightest members. “Black
leaders worked shoulder to shoulder with white men in a movement, the success of which would
have been impossible without them,” Du Bois argued.15 He said that the so-called “talented tenth”
should achieve as highly as possible within the existing social order so that they could lift up the rest
of the race. Black physicians lay at the intersection of two somewhat competing identities—they
were simultaneously members of the “talented tenth” among Black Americans and members of a
uniquely sovereign profession.
This paper examines three critical moments in the history of the American healthcare system
and the course that Black physicians (and those offering alternative models of healthcare) chose
through them. The moments in question focus on the debate over the issue of national healthcare—
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often referred to as “compulsory,” “nationalized,” or “universal”—because it was amid such debates
that the threads of patients’ needs, professional sovereignty, and racial equity converged. Proposals
for national system of healthcare have varied in scope and size, although the essence of the two sides
of the debate has remained the same.
The physicians who support such plans (to this day) emphasize the need to increase the
accessibility and affordability of care for poorer patients, while those opposed object to the
limitations on their professional sovereignty and perceived government interference in the doctorpatient relationship. This paper begins in 1945, the year that Harry S. Truman took over the U.S.
Presidency. In the eight years he spent as president, Truman spent a significant amount of his
political capital trying to enact a system of national healthcare. In accordance with the “talented
tenth” philosophy, the NMA initially rallied around Truman. Their leaders recognized that although
such a system was neither ideal for their professional interests nor in addressing the conditions that
created the health disparities with which they grappled, it was the best option they had if they sought
to improve the overall health of the Black population. By the end of the 1940s, the NMA recognized
that the AMA had such a wide-reaching ability to shape or block federal legislation that their
delegates chose a more politically savvy path, opting not to endorse the latest iteration of the Truman
proposal so that the AMA might be more inclined to accommodate the NMA’s other, more realistic
goals.
The second chapter contends with the reactivation a more activist-minded version of the
NMA during the peak of the civil rights movement in the 1960s. The NMA, under the leadership of
activist, physician, and longtime editor of the Journal of the National Medical Association (JNMA)
W. Montague Cobb, drafted off of the momentum of the civil rights movement. They supported
Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in their pursuit to enact national healthcare and
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successfully aligned themselves with civil rights activists in opposition to the AMA’s continued
acceptance of de facto segregation within their ranks. The decade marked a decided swing away
from the accommodationist stance the NMA had struck in 1949, back towards an underdog position
from which they voiced a minority opinion in the interest of their “constituency” of Black patients.
The NMA heralded the 1965 passage of Medicare as a victory for both their organization and their
race—but the shine of that victory would soon tarnish.
Chapter three covers the emergence of new alternative approaches to healthcare in a reaction
to the near-immediate failures—or at least limited successes—of Medicare and Medicaid. While the
1960s brought about the NMA’s most effective rebuke of the AMA, the 1970s begot the
convergence of the two professional societies. The breadth of failure of Johnson’s Great Society
program—and the civil rights activists that had backed him—across sectors provoked action from
radical groups that had begun to grow out of (and in response to) their more moderate
contemporaries of the mid-1960s. The BPP sprouted from the fertile discontent with Community
Action Programs (CAPs); the fruits of their growth were the various programs, all socialist in nature,
through which the BPP addressed the fundamental needs of urban-dwelling Black Americans. In
addition to free breakfasts and clothing, the Party began to provide free healthcare via the PFMCs in
1971. Although the Party’s efforts were short-lived—they had crumbled by the early 1980s—their
mere existence and brief success offers a startling contrast to the evolved position of the NMA.
The path that the NMA followed through these particular moments of tension and the
alternatives that emerged in their wake highlight the serious problems that have developed as a result
of the cyclical convergence of American racism and capitalism. This paper brings to light the
moments in which Black medical professionals faced the choice of serving their own interests as
professionals or their own interests as Black Americans. It offers critiques of the NMA’s decisions,

9
but only insofar as the members who made those decisions operated under the duress caused by the
weight of American racism. As the NMA’s leaders have often noted, the organization was “born of
the exigencies of the American environment,” and it was within that evolving environment that this
narrative takes place.16
The failure of the NMA to resolve the inequitable distribution of healthcare is not one for
which they bear total or even most responsibility. The tediously won victories of the NMA—and the
defeat of the alternatives which later emerged—speak to the difficulty of escaping the social
stratification that is a key component of a capitalist society. At every juncture at which true reform
was possible, efforts fell short. While healthcare is not specifically a racial issue, the racially
disparate distribution of America’s health problems provide a particularly illustrative entrance to the
unalignment of professional sovereignty and healthcare outcomes. The forbearers of scholarship on
the issue—particularly Du Bois among them—concluded early on that systemic oppression resulted
in health inequities. By keeping the representatives—Black physicians—of those Americans who
suffered disproportionately—the Black population—a disenfranchised party for as long as possible,
the White hegemony could continue to profit. The authors of a 1948 report by the Brookings
Institution claimed that Americans were in the best health of any nation, but they had to draw a
distinction to do so: their claim related only to the White population.17 It is with this understanding
that the Panther’s radical alternative makes sense. They acted upon the philosophies of socialist and
communist revolutionaries because the philosophy of American capitalism had failed—or
sacrificed—them so miserably.

16
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Historian Lizabeth Cohen’s thesis on the connection between national identity and post-war
consumerism provides the basis for Tomes’ work, who, in turn, provides the foundation for my own
scholarship. Cohen argues, “the new postwar order deemed, then, that the good customer devoted to
‘more, newer, and better’ was in fact the good citizen, responsible for making the United States a
more desirable place for all its people.”18 Tomes makes the leap that this growing sentiment of
consumer-nationalism solidified the formation of a trend that had been building for several decades:
the American patient became a consumer of healthcare, a product they knew little about but were
convinced they needed.19 “The politics of consumerism tend to privilege the interests of people with
money to spend,” Tomes notes.20 While Black Americans were not, for the most part, those with
money to spend, Black physicians were the exception to a certain extent. Chapters One and Two
explore the ways in which Black physicians sought to offer black patients entrance into the
healthcare marketplace, while Chapter Three details how their failure to do so triggered a solution
that rejected the notion of a marketplace entirely.
The work of sociologist Alondra Nelson, author of the only definitive history of the BPP’s
free clinics, tracks the rise of the Panthers’ clinics in the ideologically rich soil from which they
grew, soil containing the precursor to modern-day identity politics. Her thesis that the BPP “laid
claim to recent civil rights landmarks even as they stridently exposed the limits of those milestones
under late capitalism” provides a useful foil to the narrative of the NMA’s shift in the 1970s from
participation in identity politics into politics at-large.21
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Contemporary scholars of race, medicine, and bioethics such as Dorothy Roberts and
Jonathan Kahn have addressed the more recent rise of the race-based therapies, arguing that they
reinforce dangerous misconceptions of biological racial essentialism.22 The development of racebased therapies, the advocacy of the NMA, and the rise of the PFMCs all occurred in response to the
racially inequitable distribution of good health in America. As Roberts notes, the development of
race-based therapies does not indicate that the inequity will soon disappear; rather, it is indicative of
a social atmosphere that has made such therapies profitable.
This contemporary scholarship provides much of the basis for my own work on the NMA.
The NMA’s course through the web of intersecting issues of segregation in healthcare settings,
accessibility of affordable care, and professional sovereignty did not tack dramatically back and
forth. Rather, the organization took gentle turns in response to various outside factors. I highlight the
moments at which a gentle push of the tiller resulted in NMA falling to one side of a debate or
another, despite making only a slight change in their course.
When this story begins in 1945, the NMA was on the cusp of a radical transformation. Two
factors informed their transformation. First was the general health of the Black population. In 1906,
Du Bois presented the Eleventh Atlanta Conference with the findings of his study “The Health and
Physique of the Negro American.” He found that from 1896–1905, Blacks suffered a death rate that
was 3.8 people per thousand higher than their White counterparts in northern cities and found that
they had higher incidents of commons diseases.23 More importantly, Du Bois connected the higher
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rates of poor health and death to conditions of poverty by breaking his study down along racial and
regional lines. Even though White southerners also suffered from conditions of poor health, Du
Bois’ findings led him to conclude that “all the evidence goes to show that it is not a racial disease
but a social disease.”24 Although he conducted his study 40 years prior to the beginning of this story,
the social conditions that created this “social disease” very much remained in place.
The second factor informing the NMA’s transformation was a critical source of internal
tension. In the half-century leading up to Truman’s proposal, the NMA had tried to fight the racial
health disparity by leading the Black Hospital Movement to erect separate facilities for Black
patients. The NMA recognized that segregation was an unfortunate reality and believed that their
best approach to serving Black patients would be to work with the doctrine.25 By 1944, the number
of black hospitals—meaning those run and staffed primarily by Black medical personnel for the
treatment of Black patients—had fallen, from 202 in 1923, to 124.26 While the institutions
effectively saved the Black medical profession, they were mostly rudimentary and unaccredited.
They did little to further educate the next generation of Black physicians in a profession where
credentials were paramount. As civil rights discourse began to focus on desegregation, the NMA
partnered with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in
pursuit of this new goal.
The NMA contended with both immediate and long-term options for addressing the poor
state of health of the Black Americans. In the immediate future, comprehensive healthcare could
address the problems. But looking into the future, the NMA’s leaders recognized the need for
desegregation. The AMA opposed national healthcare and showed no willingness to make any
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substantive effort to encourage desegregation. But the latter was a much more achievable goal for
the NMA, and it did not require them to sacrifice an ounce of professional sovereignty. It is amid the
tension of these three considerations—the need for short-term solutions, desegregation, and
professional sovereignty—that chapter one begins.
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Chapter One
A Time to Lose—The Politics of Compromise
What you want is very apt to come if you work for it patiently and persistently, intelligently
and hopefully, earnestly and industriously, trusting all things, and enduring all things, but
utilizing to the best advantage every opportunity that you have. This is the Creed of Success
that has been followed consciously, or unconsciously, by the winners in every age and every
clime.1
These words, nodding to the language of chapter thirteen of Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians,
opened the Salutatory editorial in the first edition of the JNMA published in 1909. The journal’s
editor, Dr. J. A. Kenney, extolled the virtues of this creed. He injected a burst of inspiration into the
editorial with a reference to the achievements of outspoken abolitionist Frederick Douglass,
crediting the creed with the achievements of “a Negro slave outwitting his masters and finally
becoming one of the greatest orators of his age.”
“The rise of the National Medical Association among a people who less than a century ago
was believed incapable of comprehending any branch of science—are but simple illustrations of the
workings of this Creed of Success,” Kenney continued. Indeed, the stature of the NMA was worthy
of such extravagant celebration. A month following Washington’s “Atlanta Compromise” speech,
twelve Black physicians met at the First Congregational Church in Atlanta and formed what would
become the NMA.2 The organization’s membership grew significantly during the next decade and a
half—its roster boasted over 500 members by 1910, the journal’s second year of publication.3 The
NMA’s founders named the conditions that demanded the organization’s creation carefully. The
NMA’s mission stated that it was “conceived in no spirit of racial exclusiveness, fostering no ethnic
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antagonisms, but born out of the exigencies of the American environment.”4 The delicate language
referred diplomatically to the structural racism under which Black physicians operated during the
Jim Crow era. The AMA rejected the applications of several Black physicians on the basis of race in
the years prior to the NMA’s founding, and the Reconstruction-era hope of racial equality had longsince crumbled. Jim Crow policies pervaded the nation and dictated the order of social and
professional life. Professional accreditation was no exception.
The AMA comprised the body of White elite physicians who sought the status recognition
that the organization afforded to them. The organization’s initial prerogative was to control medical
education (which, if done successfully, would allow them control over the meaning and significance
of a medical license). As Paul Starr argues, the American medical establishment was far from
cohesive at this time and the AMA represented the more conservative wing of medical
professionals.5 Their push to consolidate and regulate medical schools reflected the AMA’s desire to
grow the profession’s prestige and credibility, a task that could only be achieved, in their eyes, if
quacks, homeopathic doctors and eclectic practitioners were not allowed to enjoy the same status. As
the AMA consolidated its power, it slowly became the mouthpiece for the medical establishment,
which was overwhelmingly White.
Implicit in their mission to elevate the profession was the belief that medicine should only be
practiced by certain people—primarily the well-educated White elite. As a product of racial
segregation, Black medical schools were often underfunded, resulting in less-qualified graduates. If
the AMA sought to eradicate inferior medical schools, the NMA was founded, in part, out of a desire
to improve the quality of the education provided at Black medical schools rather than eradicate them.
Although over a dozen medical colleges dedicated to training Black physicians existed by the turn of
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the century, they scraped by with the support of church congregations and “benevolent groups.”6 The
AMA’s exclusion of three Black Howard University medical professors and the sorry state of the
Black community’s medical schools necessitated the creation of an alternative. In the era of Plessy v
Ferguson (which was decided a year after the NMA’s formal creation), the NMA was, theoretically,
a reflection of the “separate but equal” doctrine. It was to be the separate but equal alternative to the
AMA.
The stated mission of the NMA was to serve Black patients but the organization was, of
course, also a professional society. While the somatic well-being of the population and the financial
well-being of the physician were not inherently opposing interests, Black physicians faced a
challenge in trying to serve both simultaneously. Composed of only a handful of physicians in a field
with relatively few Black doctors to begin with, the NMA faced myriad challenges. They also
harbored a conflict of class and race within the very nature of their existence. Within their race,
Black physicians were an elite class; within society at-large, they were second class citizens.
If the NMA was a Black alternative to the AMA, the two organizations pursued similar
goals, albeit with unequal resources and different starting lines. Black physicians attended inferior
medical schools, worked in segregated hospitals that often lacked adequate facilities, and were
barred entry from the professional associations that could lobby for improvements. The divide
between the two organizations grew with the release of the Flexner Report, which, under the
watchful eye of the AMA, further wreaked havoc on Black medical institutions.
Released in 1910 and funded by the Carnegie Foundation, the report written by Abraham
Flexner (notably not a physician) on the status of medical education in the United States transformed
the nation’s healthcare establishments. Flexner’s intention was to create a nation-wide, uniform
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model against which state medical boards could compare and evaluate their local medical schools.
By closing schools that failed to meet Flexner’s standards, state boards maintained some control
over the baseline competency of physicians, allowing them to limit who could and could not become
a doctor. The report created a ranked grading system for medical schools based on the quality of the
education they provided. Specifically, the Flexner Report analyzed each of the country’s 155
medical schools by comparing them to the AMA’s model of a medical education. The model used to
evaluate schools combined experience in a laboratory and in a clinic at a functioning hospital. It
recommended allowing state medical licensing boards to enforce the AMA’s standards—which were
the desired status quo—upon existing schools. It was the state agencies, therefore, that would
enforce the AMA’s standards upon medical schools. The report targeted institutions that were not
using such a model (such as schools teaching homeopathic medicine) or those with inadequate
laboratory facilities.7 Medical schools were not exempt from the racialized implications of
socioeconomic inequality, meaning Black medical schools were generally underfunded and lacking
in proper facilities. The Flexner Report brought the state of medical schools of all types—Black
schools included—and their apparent inadequacy (at least compared to the AMA’s standards) to the
forefront of an ongoing debate over the professionalization of medicine.
The pervasiveness of systemic racism—and arguably the implicit racism of the report’s
mission— incurred devastating effects upon Black medical schools which, during the Jim Crow era,
were the only ones Black doctors could attend. Of the nation’s fourteen Black medical schools,
twelve shut down as a result of the report. According to Starr, the rising price of medical school had
already jeopardized many schools’ viability by 1910, and the Flexner Report only sped up the
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process of closing those which were not going to or should not have survived.8 He argued that the
state of American medical education was abysmal enough that the report was necessary in order for
the profession to be taken seriously. Starr neglected to mention (both in his 1982 book and as
recently as a 2010 interview) the racially discriminative effects of the report.9 Despite the absence of
race in Starr’s evaluation of the report, the discriminatory effects are well-documented elsewhere.
Editorials from the era reflect the NMA’s desire for the same prestige sought by the AMA’s White
members. The NMA sought to improve the overall quality of medical education not by forcing the
closure of schools that failed to meet certain standards, but by improving such schools so that they
could provide an adequate education.10
As the effects of the Flexner Report rippled through the coming decades, healthcare became
an increasingly debated topic on a national scale. By the end of the 1910s, the first proposal for a
system of compulsory healthcare in American had been drafted by a small group of economists
calling themselves the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL). The proposed policy
addressed equality on the patient side of the equation, although as a matter of practice, such equality
was inseparable from the disparity in access to quality medical education. The plan initially received
tepid support from the AMA’s leadership, who viewed it as a new and improved version of the
systems already in place in Germany and under development in England.11 The NMA had neither the
critical mass nor the required organizational savvy to make any position they held relevant to the
national debate at the time. As discussions of different configurations of a national approach to
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healthcare became increasingly common during the pre-war years, the AMA changed its position
and became a vocal opponent of such national healthcare programs.
Meanwhile, the NMA had only begun to consider such matters with respect to their
constituency. They had a far shorter membership roll than the AMA and 50 fewer years of
experience in influencing policy. Still, as the 1930s came to a close, the NMA would find itself
charged with representing the interests of Black patients in a heated debate over the issue of
compulsory national insurance. The AMA opposed compulsory insurance with vigor. The matter
was not so simple for the NMA, for whom race, not just professional sovereignty, remained a factor.
In the years after his presidency ended, Harry S. Truman reflected in a memoir that “I have
had some bitter disappointments as President but one that has troubled me most, in a personal way,
has been the failure to defeat organized opposition to a national compulsory health insurance
program.”12 This source of disappointment was the result of a battle that had lasted almost his entire
presidency, and he could not have more accurately described his opposition than to call them
“organized.” The AMA would spend most of Truman’s presidency lobbing sharp attacks at the
President and the members of his administration who most fervently fought for the President’s health
care proposals.
President Franklin Roosevelt had whipped together a coalition of rural, southern Black voters
and a racially diverse base of northerners to support the New Deal. This union, however, would
crumble under Truman. He was no ardent advocate for civil rights—his evolution on the matter was
quick and politically motivated. Having observed the racial diversity of his base, Truman took up the
cause which most prominently manifested in his order to desegregate the armed forces in 1948.13
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The move prompted conservative, segregationist Democrats to fracture the party during the 1948
convention.14
Inheriting the legacy of Roosevelt and the New Deal, Truman sought to enact some of his
own social reforms. Primary among them was his desire to overhaul the American healthcare
system. Roosevelt and the architects of the New Deal had left health insurance out of the Social
Security Act and other programs in anticipation of stiff resistance from organized medical groups
such as the AMA.15 But the AMA’s resistance to such measures did not reflect the actual needs of
the American people. A 1945 study by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Education found that approximately 75 percent of Americans had no medical insurance and only 2.5
percent had “comprehensive” coverage.16
Leveraging both the success of the New Deal and the need for medical care created by World
War II, Truman outlined his proposal in a lengthy message to Congress in November 1945, seven
months into his presidency. Aware that his proposal was vulnerable to accusations of socialism,
Truman crafted a careful pitch for his approach to the nation’s health, one which was far more
comprehensive than anything previously endorsed by any U.S. president. “I recommend solving the
basic problem by distributing the costs through expansion of our existing compulsory social
insurance system. This is not socialized medicine,” Truman affirmed.17
He began his speech by highlighting the enormous number of young men revealed to be
unhealthy by the Selective Service physicals that had taken place throughout the World War II. After
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making the point that health was directly connected to the nation’s ability to defend itself, Truman
offered the first presidential proposal of a nationalized comprehensive system of healthcare:
Everyone should have ready access to all necessary medical, hospital and related services.
Everyone who carries fire insurance knows how the law of averages is made to work
so as to spread the risk, and to benefit the insured who actually suffers the loss. If instead of
the costs of sickness being paid only by those who get sick, all the people—sick and well—
were required to pay premiums into an insurance fund, the pool of funds thus created would
enable all who do fall sick to be adequately served without overburdening anyone. That is the
principle upon which all forms of insurance are based.18
The first plan for a so-called “compulsory healthcare” system had been introduced in 1943 by
Senator Robert Wagner (D-NY), Senator James Murray (D-MT), and Representative John Dingell
(D-MI). Without Roosevelt’s support and the war still raging, the first iteration of the WagnerMurray-Dingell bill died in committee.19 Introduced again on Nov. 19, 1945 (the same day that
Truman sent his message to Congress on the matter), the proposed bill would have radically shifted
Americans’ ability to access healthcare. Truman maintained that the plan would not lead to
government interference in the doctor-patient relationship, although his repeated assurance would do
little to assuage the AMA’s concerns.20 According to one outline that appeared in The New York
Times, the “freedom of medical practice is carefully safeguarded” in the 1945 version of the bill.21
Truman, too, was careful to emphasize this point, writing “I repeat—what I am recommending is not
socialized medicine. Socialized medicine means that all doctors work as employees of government.
The American people want no such system. No such system is here proposed.”22 This would become
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a common refrain throughout the rest of Truman’s presidency as the plan for national healthcare
evolved in an effort to compromise with partisan combatants.
Had they passed, S. 1606 and H.R. 4730 (the names for the Senate and House version of the
Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill otherwise known as the National Health Act of 1945) would have
introduced five provisions to improve the healthcare of the American people via funding of state
programs (Title I) and created a prepaid system of government-facilitated health insurance (under
Title II). 23 Title I’s first four provisions would have bolstered federal aid grants to states for public
health services, maternal and child health and welfare services, and health services for the poor; the
fifth would have used the prepaid care plan to support nonprofit institutions conducting research or
facilitating medical education. Title II would have established an income (and/or payroll) tax-based
fund, like the existing payment system for Social Security, into which every employed American
would contribute via a four percent tax on the first $3600 of their annual earnings. In the event that
they required medical care, payment for such care would come out of the prepaid fund if the patient
so desired. The proposal would have provided health insurance to every employed American and
their family, while unemployed Americans would be covered under a separate fund.
To Truman and the bill’s authors, this proposal was little more than the federal government
bolstering public health facilities and equalizing access to healthcare by managing the distribution of
funds. The New Deal had normalized the notion of a social safety net, and they viewed his plan as an
extension of that net. From the perspective of the bill’s authors—which contended primarily with the
health of the nation as a whole—the expansion of healthcare coverage to most Americans would
simultaneously cut healthcare expenditures overall and expand the network of high-quality medical
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care to previously underserved areas by funding the construction of new facilities while ensuring that
residents of those areas could afford to attend them. Despite Truman’s unrelenting attempts to
differentiate his proposed national health plan from socialized medicine and Democratic control of
both chambers of Congress, the resistance he met was fierce, fervent, and well-funded. Truman’s
rhetoric was based around the argument that healthcare that was accessible to all was the backbone
of a strong nation. He frequently touched upon the issue of defense readiness and viewed his plan as
a “logical extension of the present social-security system.”24 His opponents, however, did not see it
as such.
Physicians of the AMA feared that cutting costs would take money out of their pockets,
which had been amply padded during the war years as the number of physicians dropped
dramatically. The AMA also insisted that the bill interfered with their freedom—a claim that was
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simultaneously truthful and misleading. On one hand, the passage of Truman’s proposal would have
resulted in government oversight and management of an industry that was highly lucrative as a result
of the liberty it had enjoyed since its inception. The federal government would have exerted some
control over the price of such care under this system in order to ensure it was fair and that physicians
did not treat the fund from which they were compensated like an unmanaged savings account from
which they would make unlimited withdrawals.
By 1945, the AMA had codified its position as the definitive mouthpiece for the medical
profession on political matters. In a post-Flexner Report world, the AMA’s standards for what
constituted a medical professional had defined the field; the organization’s size and resources
enabled it to sway policy more so than any other of the various medical professional organizations.
The AMA’s self-appointed position in the professional and political milieu informs the disgust
expressed in their 1943 reaction to the first proposed draft of Truman’s plan. “Inquiry also reveals
that … representatives of the medical profession … were not consulted in the development of the
medical provisions,” read an editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).25
A report compiled in 1945 by the AMA’s Council on Medical Service and Public Relations
catalogued unknown costs, lobbyists with ulterior motives (they took particular aim at organized
labor), and the unwieldiness of a national system in addressing local issues. As Truman pushed
forward with his plan, their response became increasingly political. “This is government by minority
with a vengeance,” the AMA declared.26
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The NMA, however, fell on the other side of the debate. NMA President Dr. Emory I.
Robinson joined a number of physicians representing various professional organizations at the
Senate hearings on the 1945 proposal and took a definite stance on the bill:
The National Medical Association is firm in its belief that the various sections of the bill, if
put into operation, would help to improve the health of the Nation as a whole, and
particularly the health of individuals in the low socioeconomic level which includes a large
section of the Negro population. Because the National Medical Association is an
organization composed of Negro physicians, it is particularly interested in the welfare of
Negro people.27
This was a clear contrast with the AMA. The larger organization seized on physicians’ loss of
freedom, and their solutions to ameliorate the financial and geographical barriers that prevented
Americans from accessing healthcare were constrained by that overriding concern. But the
physicians of the NMA had two interests to serve: those of Black patients, and those of their own
professional sovereignty. As Robinson had said, the NMA’s leadership had chosen to prioritize the
former of those two interests. Of course, the body was not homogenous in its stance on the issue, but
the consensus was that the NMA was willing to compromise on the liberty of their doctors in pursuit
of accessible healthcare for their patients.
The leadership of the NMA certainly found flaws in the proposal at hand. But they were all
too aware of the preexisting conditions of discrimination in America, and gains had to be pursued
when they were offered. An article in The Chicago Defender noted that Black observers of an
alternative proposal from Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) that proposed federal grants to wealthy states
in lieu of a national healthcare fund were “leery of any bill that smells of ‘states rights’ in view of
historical treatment of Negroes in the South.”28 Dr. John A. C. Lattimore, then the president-elect of
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the NMA, offered a similar indictment of both the poor treatment of Black patients in the South and
the AMA’s lack of action on the matter. “The AMA has known for a long time of the miserable
neglect of the health of the Negro population, especially in the South. The fact that they have done
nothing about it has led to a widespread feeling in the South that the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill
must go over,” Lattimore told the Defender.29
The NMA’s rhetoric on the matter reflected precisely the sentiments expressed in their
mission statement: they were responding to the exigencies of the American environment. The
“American environment” was one of de jure segregation and de facto discrimination; White
physicians routinely denied care to Black patients, or worse, used them as unwitting subjects for
experimentation. On a structural scale, the overall poor state of health of Black Americans was the
result of higher poverty rates and lesser access to basic amenities, particularly in rural areas.30 The
organization’s support for Truman’s plan reflected the urgent need within their community for
accessible healthcare, rather than an ideological alignment of Black medical professionals with
political ideology enshrined within the proposal for nationalized healthcare. Although neither the
NMA nor the AMA was entirely homogenous within its ranks and the physicians who constituted
their bodies were not in total agreement on the issue of national healthcare, the consensus from each
organization yielded opposing outcomes.
The AMA’s opposition to the bill and decision to prioritize the interest of doctors over those
of patients can be explained by several factors. First, the AMA disagreed with the characterization
and nature of the problems supposedly addressed by the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill. In their
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testimony on the matter, the AMA argued that the health of the American people was not as bad the
bill’s backers suggested.31 Therefore they saw the National Health Act of 1945 as an ineffectual
solution to the problems facing American patients according to their observations of that need. The
AMA resisted government oversight of their profession, arguing that a top-down government-run
system would fail to address the varying local needs of individuals and communities. They argued
that having complete freedom from government control was a critical component of their ability to
address the needs of their patients.
Lastly, the AMA’s constituency of primarily doctors and secondarily patients were mostly
White as a result of legally sanctioned segregation. The NMA did not take a stance on integration in
the healthcare system until 1946—up to that point, the organization had been a supporter of the
Black Hospital Movement, the goal of which was to establish separate hospitals where Black
patients could receive treatment from Black doctors in first-class facilities.32 The structural racism
under which White doctors operated allowed them to disregard racial inequities in health. Black
patients received treatment in separate, inferior parts of the hospital; states passed laws designating
“colored” entrances to hospitals, and in Alabama, White nurses were prohibited from entering rooms
where Black men were being treated.33 White doctors treated primarily White patients and the
construction of the clinical experience allowed them to relegate Black patients to an inferior class of
patient.34
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Of the three primary factors behind the AMA’s opposition to Truman’s proposal, the second
(and most frequently lamented) point applied to the NMA as well. Some, if not many, of the NMA’s
members shared the sentiment that government oversight of their professional career would result in
diminished profits and a loss of their “sacred” independence. This conviction was so strongly held
by a small but vocal minority of the NMA’s members that they tried to impeach Robinson after his
1946 testimony in support of the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill.35 However, a majority of the NMA’s
body was willing to sacrifice some of their freedom for the benefit of Black patients. Despite the rift,
the NMA’s endorsement of the 1945 bill was a telling indication of the atmosphere in which these
debates took place.
Although the 79th Congress did pass the Hill-Burton act that funded the construction of
hospitals in rural areas and affirmed that they must have adequate facilities for both Black and White
patients, the National Health Act of 1945 never made it to a floor vote. While the vehement
objections of the AMA drove the opposition, they were joined by smaller groups representing
organized medicine including the American Dental Association, the Citizens Medical Reference
Bureau (a group of organized citizens unified solely against compulsory healthcare) and a number of
state medical societies.36 Their objections echoed those of the AMA—they feared a loss of
independence.
By 1946, the AMA’s ardent rhetoric prevailed, costing Truman his best shot at achieving
universal coverage. Democrats also lost control of both chambers of Congress in the 1946 midterms,
diminishing Truman’s ability to pass his legislative priorities. However, national healthcare
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remained a priority for Truman, a festering wound for the AMA, and the site of delicate compromise
for the NMA.
Senators Wagner, Murray, and Dingell acted again upon the President’s expressed wishes
after the midterm elections and introduced the National Insurance and Public Health Act of 1947 in
May of that year. The 1947 version of the bill was nearly identical to the 1945 version, although it
contained several changes in response to the objections voiced by the AMA during hearings on the
earlier legislation. Like its predecessor, the act would have provided coverage to at least 85 percent
of Americans via a national prepaid plan funded via payroll taxes. Patients would retain free choice
of their doctors, and doctors would retain free choice over their patients.37 Under the new plan,
explicit language spelled out the rights of each state to operate its own insurance plan so long as the
plan met minimum standards established by the federal government. The intention of this language
was to assuage concerns that a nationally administered plan would fail to meet the differing needs of
local regions. The new bill also revised the proposed mechanism of oversight. Previously, the
Surgeon General had sole control over the administration. In the 1947 version, a five-person board
was to oversee the administration, including the Surgeon General, the Commissioner of Social
Security, and three Senate-approved presidential appointees. Finally, while the new version retained
limits on the number of patients a doctor was allowed to have, it shifted the responsibility for setting
these limits to local practitioners. This was a direct response to the AMA’s criticism of the 1945 bill.
The organization had argued that letting the Surgeon General manage such limits would shackle
doctors, cap their income, and inhibit their freedom to choose their patients. While some of the
AMA’s grievances clearly obscured their underlying desire maintain their steady income, this
change addressed a legitimate concern that certain areas had lower doctor-to-patient ratios.
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Variances within this ratio across regions required a tailored approach so as to avoid precluding
patients from receiving care in areas where few physicians served large populations.
Despite the efforts to accommodate them, the AMA was no more inclined to accept the 1947
proposal. Once again, a contingent of Republican senators sponsored an alternative bill, S. 545, that
would have provided grants to states to provide free health insurance on the basis of demonstrated
need. The bill’s sponsors, Senators Taft, Joseph H. Ball (R-MN), H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ), and
Forrest C. Donnell (R-MI), were all conservatives with varying degrees of allegiance to the evolving
party platform. They acted upon their values of fiscal conservatism from which they derived
objections to the sort of New Deal-era spending reflected in the Democrats’ proposals. The
Republican opposition found a battle-ready ally in the AMA, and together the powerful lobby of
organized medicine and congressional Republicans went about trying to defeat Truman’s plan.
Senator Smith, whose 1946 reelection was deemed “fortunate” in an AMA editorial, became a key
player in the debate.38 The same month that Murray introduced the new draft of Truman’s plan,
Smith, now chairman of the subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, requested that the Brookings Institution conduct a study of the two proposals. The study,
completed and published in April 1948, concluded that “compulsory insurance would inject the
government into the relationship between the practitioner and the patient. A real danger exists that
government actions would impair that relationship and hence the quality of medical care.”39 The
report rejected the entire basis of Truman’s argument that universal healthcare was necessary.
Despite the conclusion that national healthcare was not needed, the racial disparity in access
to quality healthcare by the nation’s most needy remained. The authors claimed that “probably no
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great nation in the world has among its white population better health than prevails in the United
States.”40 Although they could reject nearly every other argument in favor of compulsory healthcare,
even the report’s authors had to concede Black Americans faced a more dire predicament than the
rest of the country.
The Brookings Institution’s endorsement of the Republican plan was indicative of a
significant shift in the battle over universal healthcare. It was the first shot fired in a new chapter of a
fight that would become increasingly partisan as the two sides grew entrenched in their positions,
leaving the NMA to straddle a widening divide. Several events precipitated this shift. Truman’s 1948
reelection triggered anxiety within the AMA, as did his renewed attempts at passing national
healthcare. In response, the AMA employed new offensive strategies including an attempt to court
the support of the NMA.
Truman’s 1948 reelection confirmed the AMA’s fears that his vision for the country—
increased (but not complete) racial equality and a contained expansion of New Deal-era policies—
had support. Truman had successfully begun to court Black voters by desegregating the armed
forces, tearing them away from their traditional allegiance to the party of Lincoln, the Republicans.41
But the Republican Congress had stonewalled most of his domestic policy initiatives and although
his support for civil rights had gained him Black voters, it caused existing segregationist members of
his party to lead an electoral insurrection. With poor poll numbers, few had expected Truman to
emerge victorious. His unexpected win in 1948 meant that the AMA now confronted an emboldened
opponent, which led the organization to increase its efforts in opposing Truman’s plan.
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In a November 1948 editorial (ostensibly published just after the election), the NMA’s
editorial board highlighted the expanding divide between the two sides of the debate:
Socialized Medicine is a shibboleth around which radical supporters rally with fanatical zeal.
To them it is the only way, the one panacea for the nation's physical ills. Their dogmatic faith
permits no doubt or question of the infallible perfection of the plan. For them it is the one and
only road to national health.
On the other hand, such proposals as the national health program in its present form
arouses the ire and opposition of stubborn reactionaries to an equal degree. Socialized
medicine in any form is anathema to them; it is Joe Stalin undisguised. As a result, they
oppose any compromise or change in the present system, however wise.42
The NMA had tried to maintain a delicate position on the matter—they had allegiances on both sides
of the debate. This became more difficult to maintain after Truman’s reelection caused the AMA to
reenergize their opposition efforts. In the same issue of the JNMA, the NMA’s outgoing president,
Dr. Lattimore, tried to affirm the organization’s stance. “The Negro doctor realizes the acute need of
medical service which will reach the millions of negroes in the South. Therefore, the NMA
welcomes any type of medicine that will meet the needs of the majority of our group,” Lattimore
said, firing back at the AMA’s acquiescence to the prejudice of the southern doctors who continued
to oppose the integration of local chapters.43 While the NMA preached a careful, moderate approach,
the AMA struck up a more combative stance than ever before.
The AMA’s efforts began immediately after the election. On November 30, 1948 the AMA’s
House of Delegates secretly approved a resolution to levy a voluntary $25 membership fee upon its
members explicitly for the purpose of expanding its Washington D.C. office, hiring a public
relations firm, and launching a publicity campaign against a national health plan.44 The New York
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Times reported that the decision was made to create a $3,500,000 war chest.45 By 1949, the conflict
between the NMA, the AMA, and the Truman Administration had become increasingly combative.
Truman, having affirmed support for his platform during his reelection, repeated to Congress
the same directive he had delivered in 1945.46 On April 22, 1949 he called, once again, for a
comprehensive health insurance program to cover every American and for increased funding for
hospitals and medical schools. The Senate bill introduced at the same time, S. 1679 of the 81st
Congress, outlined a similar program to those proposed in 1945 and 1947. The Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare considered S. 1679 simultaneously with three other bills. Collectively,
they represented the splintering of partisan congressional consensus on the matter. The proposals
ranged from a prepaid national plan (as before) with increased power given to individual states in
administering care, to voluntary or partially voluntary plans (proposed once again by Republican
senators).47 Although the AMA supported the proposals for voluntary insurance, they nonetheless
launched a multifaceted offensive against the other proposals, which retained the key elements they
found threatening to their profession. As before, the proposals contained state-set caps on the
number of patients per doctor and regulated treatment costs. The public relations campaign funded
by new fees was one facet of the offensive; an attempt to ally with the NMA was another.
The AMA’s tactics had succeeded in preventing the passage of Truman’s proposals, but the
organization grew anxious about the persistence of the concept and sought the NMA’s support. The
AMA’s national body was composed of delegates from local chapters, all of which set their own
entrance policies. Although chapters in the North had largely integrated, many chapters throughout
45
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the South barred entrance to Black physicians. Because most hospitals required that physicians hold
membership in the local medical association to gain admitting privileges, the consequences of the
AMA’s reluctance to force the integration of their local chapters could be directly linked to the lack
of adequate numbers of Black physicians as well as the inferior care that Black patients often
received. It was for these reasons that the NMA began to pressure the AMA to force the integration
of all their chapters. The AMA’s enormous membership and the political power they held as a result
of it meant that the NMA faced a giant enemy— but each organization wanted something out of the
other.
On the issue of national health insurance, NMA had consistently highlighted the dire need for
improved medical services for their constituents. The organization—whose members were not
universally supportive of a national program—accepted Truman’s proposal as the best option among
a variety of non-ideal alternatives early on. The NMA’s reluctant endorsement was best articulated
by the outgoing NMA President Dr. C. Herbert Marshall. On August 28, 1950, he told a crowd at the
NMA’s annual convention that voluntary health insurance would be as successful in adequately
addressing the needs of Black patients as voluntarily enlistment during wartime. Marshall
unambiguously (and hyperbolically) addressed the situation at hand:
I am unalterably opposed to socialized medicine, primarily because it destroys the most
sacred of all human relations, the relationship that exists between patient and physician.
Already industry with its hired medical staffs and voluntary health insurance companies with
their designated lists of physicians have destroyed that relationship far more than the
proposed compulsory health program.48
Marshall recognized the already muddled state of the physician-patient relationship. Beginning with
the rise of prepaid medical care on a small scale towards the end of the 1920s, an increasing number
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of patients were forced to choose their doctor from a pre-selected network.49 As Marshall saw it, the
relationship had already been compromised with little benefit to Black patients—perhaps further
compromise could yield a more positive result. However, he held this position reluctantly. The AMA
both recognized this ambivalence and knew the NMA wanted them to desegregate. In the hopes of
uniting Black and White physicians against national healthcare, the AMA began to signal that they
supported racial equality.50
On August 9, 1949, two months after their annual convention, the President-elect of the
AMA Dr. Elmer Henderson submitted a statement to the NMA asking for their support in combating
Truman’s plan. He also extended an offer to the NMA’s members to attend the AMA’s clinical
sessions the following December.51 Henderson was a fervent anti-communist committed to defeating
the Truman plan and was willing to go to great lengths to achieve this goal.52 In his appeal,
Henderson emphasized the AMA’s decision earlier that week to appoint the first Black physician to
its house of delegates. The AMA chose Dr. Peter Murray, who had served as the NMA’s president
from 1932-33.
Although neither the NMA nor the AMA were entirely homogeneous in the opinion of their
membership, both organizations maintained a broad general consensus on the matter. It was
therefore noteworthy when Murray contradicted the organization’s position in an op-ed titled “Why I
Oppose Compulsory Health Insurance” published in the JNMA in May 1949. While the AMA made
an ideological argument against Truman’s plan citing the “sacred” physician-patient relationship,
Murray’s argument was far more concerned with practicality. “Is the Government ready to guarantee
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the Negro his proportionate share of medical and health services according to the equality of his
payments? (Let us omit the question whether on a segregated basis or not),” he asked.53 Murray was
not ignorant to the AMA’s dominance—but he expressed doubt that Truman’s proposal would
change that, arguing, “the AMA is a true cross section of the dominant pattern in American life. That
dominant pattern would still operate under a system of compulsory health insurance.” Dr. Montague
Cobb, the editor of the JNMA, activist, and future NMA president criticized the AMA for selecting
Murray. Cobb was among the more activist-minded members of the NMA’s leadership, and charged
that the move was “political” claiming that Murray’s appointment constituted nothing more than a
hollow tactic by the AMA deployed in an attempt to gather the support of Black physicians in its
campaign against Truman’s program.54 There was a karmic incongruity in the AMA’s extension of
an invitation to the NMA, an organization that was founded in direct response to the AMA’s
exclusionary practices. Henderson’s blatant attempt to court the support of Black physicians by
electing Murray, an outspoken dissenter within the NMA, to the AMA’s house of delegates was only
one of several tactics the AMA employed to court the support of Black Americans.
The AMA also tried to court the support of Black patients by placing advertisements in Black
newspapers. Their effort to ingratiate themselves with the NMA initially backfired when their
advertising campaign against Truman’s plan garnered criticism from civil rights activists both in and
out of the NMA. By August, the campaign’s fund had grown to over $2,00,000 and their tactics had
grown so aggressive that they prompted an investigation by the Department of Justice.55 The
campaign cost over $1,100,000 and consisted, among various efforts, of advertisements in 11,000
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newspapers, 30 national magazines, and 300 radio stations.56 The advertisements, which were often
placed in newspapers with primarily Black readership, emphasized the dangers of “socialized
medicine” and the threat to the “sacred” bond between physician and patient. Cobb denounced the
campaign, saying “when the AMA buys space in our Negro newspapers and magazines as part of its
million dollar advertising campaign this month, we can only accuse this doctors’ lobby of a cynical
disregard for the health needs of Negroes and a callous indifference toward the constructive action
[on] their behalf.”57 The AMA’s bellicose position triggered resentful criticism from the NMA’s
leadership, however the larger organization still held the dominant position.
At the NMA’s annual convention in Detroit on August 9, 1949 (the same meeting at which
they received Henderson’s invitation to attend the AMA’s clinical sessions), Truman’s proposal
dominated the discourse. NMA President Dr. Charles Whittier delivered the opening address in
which he called for, among other things, the NMA to endorse Truman’s proposal. However, after
many hours of vigorous debate, it became apparent that the organization’s members were not close
to a consensus on the issue. “It was smart politics, and gave Negro doctors a year to see what
concessions they could get at hospitals and medical schools controlled by A.M.A. members,” Time
reported. 58 The NMA’s small body of 4,000 members could exert little influence in comparison to
the resources wielded by the AMA’s leadership, derived from their 140,000 members. According to
some interpretations, the NMA failed to fulfill their obligation to the patients they represented. “Our
Negro professional organization had the chance to help hundreds of thousands of Negro voters to
make up their minds on an issue of vital importance to their racial group, but the NMA voted to table
any decision ‘for another year,’” wrote Lester Granger, the Executive Secretary of the National
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Urban League and visionary civic leader, in a column shortly after the convention.59 Still, the less
radical activists saw the decision as one of tactical, tempered judgement.
It was the exclusionary practices of the AMA and the need to organize the funding and
expansion of Black medical schools that prompted the founding of the NMA. But when it came to
issues of enormous gravity with national ramifications, the AMA did not just hold the cards, but it
ran the casino. A public endorsement of the Truman program would have had little impact on the
legislative outcome and would most certainly have alienated the AMA, whom the NMA had been
lobbying to take firm stance on desegregation. By 1949, the AMA had begun to signal that such
changes were on the horizon (ultimately, the AMA did not desegregate until forced to do so by the
Civil Rights Act in 1964), and the NMA had a vested interested in ensuring this transition.60 The
AMA ensured that their name carried the support of the corpus of the American medical
profession—the NMA’s members would have more influence in the profession were they allowed to
leverage the AMA’s name. While the immediate ramifications of a national health plan would be
immense for Black patients, its success was increasingly unlikely. This justified the NMA’s decision
not to endorse the plan, a decision that ultimately endeared them to the AMA, allowing them to
continue fighting for the interests of Black patients while maintaining their complete professional
sovereignty.
In July 1950, Dr. Henderson addressed the AMA convention. He grounded his speech in the
American ideal of liberty and its application in medicine, drawing upon the AMA’s language of the
previous five years:
But it is not just socialized medicine which they seek; that is only their first goal. Their real
objective is to gain control over all fields of human endeavor. Their real objective is to strip
the American people of self determination and self government and make this a socialist state
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in the pathetic pattern of the socially and economically bankrupt nations of Europe which we,
the American people, are seeking to rescue from poverty and oppression.61
Although Truman’s administration fought hard to combat this characterization, the AMA’s rhetorical
emphasis on socialism worked. Support for Truman’s plan, which had once been broad, deteriorated.
Although the NMA had loosely supported the program (in various forms at various times), they
never explicitly denied the charges of socialism—the organization’s leaders who did support the
proposal endorsed it as the lesser of two evils or the only existing remedy to a dire situation. At the
1951 AMA House of Delegates meeting, Henderson declared that the “socialistic threat” had been
dispelled for the time being.62 The election of President Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 threw the last
handful of dirt on the grave of Truman’s national health insurance proposal.
In the absence of a universal program and the context of the post-war economic boom, both
enrollment in private health insurance and the amount of money Americans spent on health
insurance and treatment increased dramatically. Over 67 percent of Americans had obtained some
form of health insurance by 1959, although health care expenditures increased over 50 percent
between 1948 and 1955. By 1955, insurance still only covered met 22.6 percent of the nation’s
medical bill.63 But the forces that had created unequal access to health care in the 1940s and the
decades prior still remained, as did the segregation that led to a deficit of physicians and hospital
wards for Black patients. As the push for racial equality began to intensify, the NMA renewed its
mandate to obtain adequate care of Black Americans.
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Chapter Two
A Time to Gain—The NMA’s Victories of the Civil Rights Era
On the afternoon of July 30, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson boarded Air Force One
bound for Kansas City, MO. Twenty minutes later, he arrived in Independence, MO, at the site of the
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. At 3:10 p.m., seated next to the 81-year-old former President
and in front of an audience of 300, Johnson signed the Social Security Amendments of 1965. In
doing so, he created the Medicare and Medicaid programs that provide health insurance to retirees
over the age of 65 and the poorest members of society. Those programs evolved from the national
health plans for which Truman had fought with great mettle throughout the duration of his
presidency. In recognition of his hard work, Johnson personally enrolled Truman and his wife as
Medicare’s first beneficiaries and signed as a witness on their registration cards.1 Among the 300
guests at the ceremony, National Medical Association President Dr. W. Montague Cobb and his
predecessor Dr. Kenneth W. Clement were the only representatives from any group of organized
physicians.2
The doctors’ presence at the ceremony marked a significant peak in status of the NMA as a
force of political influence in the U.S. At the conclusion of Truman’s presidency in 1953, the NMA
had backed off its endorsement of his program for national healthcare. Instead, they chose to
acquiesce to the AMA in the hopes that they might curry favor with the organization that effectively
spoke for their entire profession. But by 1965, the dynamic between the two professional
organizations had grown increasingly complex. The NMA began to draw legitimacy from its
alliances with a number of powerful organizations involved with the fight for civil rights. Medicine

1

“President’s Daily Diary, July 30, 1965” (U.S. Government Printing Office, July 30, 1965), LBJ Presidential Library,
http://www.lbjlibrary.net/collections/daily-diary.html.
2
“‘What Hath God Wrought’. Position Reversals by the AMA and the AAMC.,” Journal of the National Medical
Association 60, no. 6 (November 1968): 520.

41
as a profession also came under growing scrutiny as treatment costs soared, and the AMA, having
positioned itself as the monolithic mouthpiece of the field, fell victim to that scrutiny as well.3 The
1960s plied several different narrative threads into the same strand of yarn with respect to race and
medicine. The increasing velocity of the civil rights movements meant that the NMA no longer had
to choose between appeasing the AMA and pursuing legislative goals that would benefit Black
patients but to which the AMA objected.
The NMA contributed to the velocity of the civil rights movement by continuing to fight for
desegregation, an effort they had begun at the conclusion of Truman’s presidency. In March 1952,
the JNMA included for the first time a section called “The Integration Battlefront,” in which editors
published articles on the fight to desegregate hospitals and medical societies. The NMA and its
constituents recognized that both the federal government and the AMA constituted obstacles in the
battle for integration. In the Jim Crow south, White hospitals often turned away black patients on the
basis that the Black wards had no space, or turned away their doctors on the basis that they lacked
admitting privileges. The first problem required action by the federal government to forcibly
desegregate public facilities. The supreme court had ruled in the landmark 1954 Brown vs. Board of
Education decision that the “separate but equal” division of public schools based on race was
unconstitutional, but no such action applied to hospitals, public or private. According to a study in
the mid-1950s by the Urban League commissioned by civil rights activist and physician Dr. Paul B.
Cornely, Black staff ran only 17 of the 434 hospitals in the 60 cities surveyed, and of the hospitals
run by White or integrated staff, only 5.8 percent of them served an integrated patient population in
the south.4
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The second problem required the action of the AMA. The national body of the AMA
comprised delegates of local chapters. Although the organization began to decry racial segregation
and discrimination as early as 1949, they did not ban the practice within their own ranks.5 As a
result, medical societies throughout the American South continued to discriminate against Black
physicians and the AMA’s national body continued to vote against the admission of integrated local
medical societies to the national organization. The AMA’s longstanding role as the arbiter of
credentialing in the medical field resulted in a system in which local hospitals required that
physicians maintain membership in their local medical society to practice. If societies denied
membership to black physicians, they effectively barred Black physicians from practicing at local
hospitals.
Despite the AMA’s declaration against discrimination, little changed with respect to the
AMA or the federal government’s policies throughout the 1950s. Although the number of Black
medical students increased rather significantly during the decade, the facilities they encountered
upon graduation remained segregated and local medical societies often refused to grant them
admission.6 Even in 1955, an Arkansas federal court willingly ignored constitutional issues in its
decision to allow a state hospital to continue the practice of segregating patients by race. In 1958, the
James Walker Memorial Hospital won a suit after three black physicians sued on the basis of
unconstitutional discrimination after the hospital denied them admitting privileges, thus also denying
care to their patients.7 The hospital won, arguing that as a private institution it was exempt from any
constitutional requirements such as the equal protection clause of the 1870 and 1871 Civil Rights
Acts. This was a debatable premise given that the hospital had been publicly chartered and built on
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public land and then privatized by a board of trustees to whom the municipal authorities entrusted its
governance.
Beginning in the late 1950s, the NMA began to form broader coalitions to pursue
desegregation in the medical field. In 1957, Cobb organized and held the first Imhotep National
Conference on Hospital Integration. The name had been chosen in honor of the ancient Egyptian
chancellor and demigod of medicine because it served as a reminder that “dark skin was associated
with distinction in medicine before any other color,” and because the name means “he who cometh
in peace.” 8 The name also indicated Cobb’s activist streak—he was an active member of the
NAACP before becoming editor of the JNMA in 1949. He had proven himself as one the NMA’s
more radical leaders in the 1940s and would go on to become President of the NMA (1964) and the
NAACP (1976-82). The alliance he formalized in 1957 by bringing together the NMA, the NAACP,
the National Urban League, and various local medical societies unified the national effort to
desegregate hospitals.9
The year 1960 marked a turning point for the NMA. John F. Kennedy was elected President
that year and healthcare proposals continued to circulate in the chambers of Congress. Earlier in the
year, outgoing President Eisenhower had signed the Kerr-Mills act, a law that established a program
through which the federal government would match contributions to individual states funds if they
chose to provide healthcare to poor elderly patients on a means-tested basis.10 This meant that only
patients who could demonstrate that they could not afford insurance would become beneficiaries of
the program, a point that critics argued created an unreasonable amount of stigma. Kerr-Mills
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constituted a compromise between the proposals advocating for a more comprehensive system
within the Social Security system, and those in favor of private insurance. The AMA supported the
Kerr-Mills act because it saw the legislation as more limited alternative to a compulsory plan. In his
testimony on the bill, AMA President-elect Dr. Leonard Larson made a point to mention that the
AMA preferred the Kerr-Mills Act over the various other proposals (which will be discussed
shortly).11
The NMA initially supported the Kerr-Mills Act as well. In his 1960 inaugural address,
NMA President Dr. James Aldrich told the crowd “I am convinced that voluntary health insurance
coverage represents the best means of helping most people that need medical care in this aged
group.”12 A year later, incoming NMA President Dr. Vaughan C. Mason cited the 28 states in which
Kerr-Mills functioned and said that the result “appears to be flexible legislation, easily adapted to the
individual problem. If the need is great, the law can be expanded to cover it.”13 However, by 1962
the organization began to express some doubts. Tensions in southern states over civil rights had
begun to heat up—lunch counter sit-ins in 1960 and the Freedom Rides of 1961 highlighted the
violent resistance to change. Echoing the concerns they expressed over grant-in-aid programs
administered on a state-by-state basis in the 1940s, the NMA did not trust all individual states to
distribute the necessary aid, nor did they trust them to do so equitably.
As a result of the post-war economic boom, private insurance participation rates had soared,
and the period treated the AMA well. Private practitioners were charging more than ever and
justifying those charges by relying on expensive new pieces of technology and pharmaceuticals.
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Between 1950 and 1970, health care costs overall went up 124.7 percent and the number of
voluntarily insured Americans increased by over 500 percent.14 But despite new drugs and new
technology, some of which would be paid for by patients’ insurance, the healthcare system was far
from healthy. Historians have pointed out that a majority of Americans remained uninsured, and
those who were insured often received only minimal coverage.15 The FDA also lacked the proper
authority to regulate the development, efficacy claims, and prices of the growing number of
prescription drugs on the market.16 Although the medical establishment, including the NMA,
failed—or refused—to recognize the need for it, Kennedy ran on a platform in which he promised
increased consumer protections for patients and better coverage for the poor and the elderly.
Kennedy promised to ensure healthcare for the elderly through the “time-tested Social
Security insurance system.”17 In an effort to fulfill that promise, Kennedy sought an alternative to
the Kerr-Mills act, named the King-Anderson bill. He had been a cosponsor of the bill’s predecessor
when he was in the Senate due to his opposition to means-tested programs such as the Kerr-Mills
Act. Kennedy requested the legislation from Congress in February 1961 and Representative Cecil
King (D-CA) and Senator Clinton Anderson (D-NM) quickly introduced yet another proposal for
social security-based healthcare for the elderly.18 The bill was modest compared to Truman’s plan—
it would have created a compulsory system of healthcare for all retirees over age 65 and would have
been funded by a .25 percent payroll tax. A version of the proposal first had appeared in Congress in
1957, sponsored by Representative Aime Forand (D-RI). After it stalled in committee, King and
Anderson reintroduced it in 1961. Again, the bill was defeated. At the urging of the President,
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Anderson and Javits reintroduced a version of the bill once again in 1962, although it met the same
demise as its predecessors.19
The NMA had been reluctant to endorse Kennedy’s plan. Aldrich articulated this position at
his inauguration:
We must continue to fight all legislation that would bring 16,000,000 aged citizens into a
compulsory tax paid system of federal medical service without any regard for the individual's
economic status or need. It would be nothing else than socialized medicine for all persons
over the age of 65, eligible to receive social security benefits.20
At the turn of the decade, the NMA remained tethered to their earlier stance that voluntary insurance
could provide an adequate solution to the nation’s health problems. Their resistance indicated that
the organization remained confident in their ability simultaneously fulfill their duty to Black patients
while remaining aligned with the AMA position that professional sovereignty was critical to do so.
The AMA’s rhetoric on state-managed insurance had not changed since the 1940s either. At
the 1961 Clinical Session of the AMA’s house of delegates, the organization’s President Dr. Larson
told the assembled delegates that the proposed legislation constituted the “first major, irreversible
step towards the complete socialization of medical care.”21 Although the NMA also opposed the
proposal at the time, their rhetoric highlighted the fiscal advantages of the Kerr-Mills Act already in
place, and specifically called for increased federal oversight of the program to ensure the inclusion
of Black doctors.22
In Kenney’s inaugural speech, the incoming NMA president expressed doubts about both the
Kerr-Mills Act and the King-Anderson bill.23 The former roused suspicions that states might not
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enact the programs equitably, although unlike Kennedy, NMA leaders had no issue with the meanstested aspect of the law, which they instead saw as fiscally responsible. The latter struck the
physicians as expensive and detrimental to their professional freedom—“The National Medical
Association believes in the free choice of a physician and that a patient should be privileged to
exercise the right of choice,” Aldrich said in his inaugural.24 Although the physicians of the NMA
enjoyed the same prestige and privilege as their AMA counterparts, systemic racism— “the
exigencies of the American environment”—forced Black doctors to split their allegiance. They could
not be both physicians and “race men” first.
The NMA’s endorsement of a national health plan in 1946, followed by silence in 1949, and
then slow drift back to an endorsement of the Kennedy plan in 1962 was not a dramatic series of
reversing opinions. Rather, it reflected an adaptive response to these two allegiances contextualized
by the ever-changing state of civil rights in America. By 1963, federal action on civil rights seemed
imminent. Critically, medicine was not exempt. As stated by NMA President Dr. Kenneth W.
Clement in his inaugural address:
Those who oppose government sufficiently large to accomplish this have effectively opposed
and obstructed the mass uplift of Negroes. Under the banner of States Rights they have
indulged only in States and Human wrongs; and proclaiming Property Rights sovereign over
human rights, they even today oppose civil rights on the same grounds they opposed the
abolition of slavery.25
While the difference in the organization’s stances over the decades may not have been large, it was
consequential. Increasing federal involvement in civil rights meant that any federal oversight of
health care would be infused with that same ideological bent. By 1962, the NMA had reason to think
that the federal government may provide a reliable partner in abolishing the “separate but equal”
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doctrine in medicine. President Kennedy had sent his regards in to the Imhotep Conference in 1962
and 1963, and Senators Dingell and Jacob Javits (R-NY) both spoke at the conference in 1962. They
spoke in support of their pending legislation that would have forced the desegregation of hospitals
that received funding from the 1946 Hill-Burton Act. The Hill-Burton Act had long been the bane of
the NMA’s existence—the legislation had provided federal funds for medical facilities but
specifically affirmed the legality of racial segregation in them. In the south, hospitals unphased by
the minor challenge posed to their discriminatory practices by the Walker case continued to abide by
their separate but equal practices.
Even in the north, fully integrated hospitals were rare. Black patients generally received
treatment either at dedicated Black hospitals or “mixed-race” hospitals, where they were separated
by from White patients and often relegated to inferior wings of the building. Black physicians, to the
extent that they did receive admitting privileges at “mixed-race” hospitals, were only allowed to treat
Black patients. In 1962, NAACP lawyers filed suit on behalf of a dentist named George Simkins and
five other physicians, alleging that the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital had discriminated against
the doctors and their patients due to their race.26 In what would become a landmark case, the
NAACP fought on behalf of the doctors’ rights with the support of the NMA, as well as Assistant
Attorney General Burke Marshall, who reported to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.
Although the NAACP directly funded and fought the Simkins vs. Cone Memorial Hospital
case, the NMA took note of the alignment of their interest in desegregation (of both hospitals and
medical societies) and the civil rights movement. In September 1962, seven months after NAACP
attorneys filed suit in the Simkins case, incoming NMA President Kenney delivered his inaugural
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address titled, “The Social Responsibilities of the Physician Today.”27 Once again invoking the
language of his forbearers in NMA leadership and W.E.B. Du Bois, Kenney stated that the members
of the NMA “are forced by the exigencies of the American environment as it exists today to be ‘race
men.’” Kenney appealed to the NMA’s members to participate in the civil rights movement beyond
just the reach of their profession:
The Negro physician has an obligation to participate fully and effectively in the broad civil
rights movement which is even now changing the face of the nation. The financial
contributions of individual physicians, and of the National Medical Association to the
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and to the support of the Imhotep
Conference are cases in point. These must be continued and not only continued—they must
be increased. NMA should, I submit, be found at the front line in each and every significant
medical civil rights fight in our nation.28
No one moment can mark the reactivation of the “activist NMA,” but Kenney’s speech provides a
useful marker. The month before, outgoing President Mason wrote in his final President’s Column,
“The entire membership of the N.M.A. can share with pride the new stature it enjoys in the eyes of
the American Medical Association. We have been able to make the A.M.A. acutely aware of the
dynamic force exerted by our organization.”29 In the NMA’s struggle to serve both their race and
their profession, they had found a path that, for the time being, seemed as though it would let them
do both simultaneously.
By the summer of 1963, the NMA enjoyed a newfound level of recognition. On August 1 of
that year, the NMA sent a 27-person delegation including Cobb, Kenney, and Clement to the White
House to meet with Kennedy. The meeting—a first between the NMA and an American President—
signified a new status enjoyed by the NMA. Andrew Hatcher, one of Kennedy’s aides who himself
was Black, set up the meeting on the basis that the NMA represented a large number of Americans
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and, critically, supported the President’s goal to provide healthcare to the elderly via Social
Security.30 In a statement to the President after their meeting (which lasted less than 20 minutes
according to his daily diary), Cobb outlined in greater depth what the NMA wished to communicate.
Cobb focused primarily on their support of Kennedy’s proposed healthcare for the elderly (what
would soon become Medicare) and the need to desegregate hospitals. Kennedy would live just long
enough to see the latter begin.
On November 1, 1963, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a verdict in favor
of Dr. Simkins, striking down the “separate but equal” division of public hospitals; it was to
hospitals what Brown vs. Board of Education had been to schools. The decision marked two critical
turning points, one for civil rights and one for the NMA. In the context of the civil rights movement,
the Simkins decision stood as a standard bearer signaling the progress of the movement. Indeed,
numerous lawmakers cited the case in arguing in favor of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA).31 For the
NMA, Simkins signaled that their increased activism and coalitions with non-medical organizations
such as the NAACP and the AFL-CIO could produce results. Under Truman, Kennedy’s predecessor
in the fight for healthcare, the NMA held little power over the federal government and even less over
the AMA. By 1963, the NMA had forged powerful partnerships in the atmosphere of the civil rights
movement, posed serious challenges to the AMA, and caught the ear of the U.S. President. When the
NMA spoke on behalf of the nation’s Black doctors and patients, people—including the President of
the United States—listened.
Despite the attention from the federal government, Cobb pointed out in his inaugural speech
at the NMA convention in 1964 that “the Imhotep Conference failed to secure attendance by
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representatives empowered to speak from the great hospital powers, although they kept an eye
obliquely on what was being done through different observers.”32 The AMA had sent an observer in
1960 who, much to Cobb’s disappointment, took notes but declined to speak on behalf of the
organization. Whether Cobb’s selection to lead the NMA was an intentional tack to the left by the
organization’s leadership can’t be known for certain. However, regardless of the intention, the reach
of the NMA as an advocate for political change expanded with Cobb in charge. He slammed the
AMA in his speech not just for their failure to show up at the Imhotep Conferences, but because the
AMA refused to engage but then ignorantly called for such a conference. After noting their “smug
and rigid complacency,” Cobb highlighted that JAMA editor Dr. Morris Fishbein had called for a
national conference to take action on hospital integration, but only after the courts had made
segregation illegal and such a conference had been held for seven consecutive years. By the time
Cobb ascended to the presidency of the NMA, President Johnson had begun to push a progressive
liberal agenda which the NMA backed. The momentum gave cause for Cobb to write that every
member must be inspired to ask, “not what can the NMA do for me, but what can I do for the
NMA?”33
While Cobb invoked the late President Kennedy, a hero to the NMA, the AMA’s sterling
reputation declined. While the NMA’s underdog status deprived them of the same powerful punch
packed by the AMA, it also largely exempted them from the scrutiny that befell the AMA as the
public grew discontent with physicians as a demographic. Historians often highlight the 1960s as a
moment of growing social discontent marred by moments of fracture, and healthcare was no
exception. Costs soared, physicians took on more patients than ever before, yet society appeared
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“sick.”34 By 1963, the intermediate measures enacted in Kerr-Mills had proven themselves, in the
words of Democrats on the Senate Committee on Health of the Elderly, to be an “ineffective and
piecemeal approach” to the nation’s health problems.35 The AMA’s actions did not help the public’s
perception of them. The organization fielded criticism from members of Congress and the press as
they clung to the remaining prestige of the medical profession. In an effort to protect the total
sovereignty of the profession, the AMA rebuffed federal attempts to control drug pricing or
advertising and made unsavory alliances. These decisions led to headlines such as “Doctor Says
Hormone Ad Failed To Tell of 36 Abnormal Babies,” and articles detailing their alliance with the
tobacco industry in exchange for support in the fight against Medicare.36 Their position on Medicare
did little to ingratiate them with an increasingly liberal public. The NMA had realigned itself with a
Democratic party that was now prioritizing civil rights and social safety nets—the AMA did not fit
into this union.
On matters pertaining to hospital integration, AMA leadership had paid lip service but little
more. In a speech published in the November 1963 edition of the JNMA, AMA President-Elect Dr.
Norman Welch told members of the NMA that on the matter of the “separate but equal” provision of
the Hill-Burton Act, “The AMA certainly has never taken a position in support of it. I am not in
sympathy with it and I would urge its repeal.”37 The Court of Appeals overturned the provision
before the journal was released. On the matter of hospital desegregation, Welch said AMA
leadership would push the House of the Delegates at the upcoming meeting to pass a resolution
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“putting the AMA on record as opposed to discrimination because of race in the appointment of
hospital staffs.” The resolution, which called on hospitals practicing racially discriminatory hiring
practices to “study this question,” passed. However, the same deliberative body rejected a resolution
introduced by the Rhode Island Medical Society that would have denied AMA membership to any
medical society that refused to admit minority physicians.38 The fine line between the actions taken
by the AMA and the proposals left untouched indicated the organization’s recognition of the
changing atmosphere and its willingness to adapt only as much as was necessary. Robert Baker, a
philosopher specializing in bioethics, highlights the fact that although the AMA remained calm in
the face of NMA pressure to act on various issues relating to civil rights, they became quite vocal
when they felt that legislation might compromise their liberties.39As the federal government
implemented the CRA, which Johnson signed in 1964 with the support of the NMA, the AMA
vociferously fought a proposed regulation which would have required doctors to sign an oath to
comply with the CRA calling it “degrading.”40
Although AMA’s lack of action angered NMA leaders, the larger organization could perhaps
justify its inaction by continuing to engage with the NMA even if few tangible outputs resulted.
Representative leaders of the two organizations met formally in a Liaison Committee beginning in
July 1963, although the meetings were not absent of tensions—the NAACP picketed the AMA
convention one day after the first Liaison Committee met.41 As recorded by editors of the JNMA,
AMA President Dr. Edward Annis sparred with Clement and Cobb over the NMA’s endorsement of
the administration’s Medicare proposal. Annis questioned leaders of the NMA—the only
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organization of physicians to endorse and testify on behalf of Medicare—on why they supported the
bill and opposed the AMA and the rest of the country’s physicians. Annis reportedly acknowledged
that there was no connection between the NMA’s support of Medicare and the AMA’s action (or
lack thereof) on racial discrimination—meaning both parties agreed that the NMA derived its
support for the legislation from the effects of the bill itself, and not out of opposition to the AMA.42
With tensions between the AMA and the NMA over civil rights still simmering, the NMA
capitalized on their increasing power.
“We realize that the esteem in which the profession is held can be maintained only through
rendering the service which our nation anticipates,” Cobb told the Senate Committee on Finance in
the spring of 1965 during the hearings on H.R. 6675, which ultimately would become the successful
legislation that created Medicare.43 A skilled lobbyist, Cobb’s rhetoric mimicked that of the AMA,
highlighting the esteem in which the public held physicians. The passage of the bill on July 28,
1965—the result of a long struggle by Johnson and his allies—marked yet another defining moment
in the NMA’s growing stature. Cobb and Clement’s presence at the bill’s signing signaled this shift:
the NMA had joined the ranks of the establishment, largely thanks to Cobb’s work in bringing the
NMA and NAACP together to create a wieldy medical-civil rights advocacy lobby. While the NMA
aligned itself with the interests of Black patients, one must not forget that they calibrated that
alignment against their identities as Black physicians. During the Truman era, the NMA had to
choose between advancing legislation for the benefit of their patients—thus compromising their
status as professionals—or advancing their professional interests. Johnson’s presidency allowed the
NMA to serve both interests given that they could gain prestige and attention from critical political
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institutions while fighting for legislation on behalf of their patients. This is not to say that the AMA
lost its power, but that the passage of Medicare definitively affirmed that it had diminished. The
other hand tipping the scale was the civil rights movement. The NMA’s ability to contextualize the
issue of health in the larger discussion of racial equality allowed them to borrow some significant
capital. Throughout the latter half of the decade, the NMA reinvested that capital in their own
expansion.
On August 10, 1965, Dr. Leonidas H. Berry delivered his inaugural speech as the incoming
President of the NMA titled “The Continuing Task of Medicine in a Great Democratic Society.” He
succeeded Cobb, who had reshaped the NMA’s role as a lobbying power.44 But Berry looked on to
the next peak. “Doctors must participate in civic affairs in a great democratic society,” he told the
crowd.45 The NMA’s membership had expanded to over 5000, and Berry had plans for growth:
For seventy years the voice of the NMA has been continuous against segregation and
discrimination, but as an essentially segregated organization it has been the voice of one
crying in the wilderness. For the most part it has fallen upon the deaf ears of the medical
power structure. Now that we have the educating leverage of effective Federal legislation, we
must effectively integrate the National Medical Association.46
The move towards integration constituted part of Berry’s plan to keep the NMA on its trajectory of
growth and relevance. That November, NMA representatives consulted at a conference with
Undersecretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Wilbur Cohen along with members of the AMA
and other organizations of medical professionals.47 The conference was just one sign of the NMA’s
advancement. In an editorial in the November 1968 edition of the JNMA, the Editorial Board
extolled the decade’s accomplishments.48 The editorial cited not only the Medicare victory and the
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address by President Johnson at the NMA’s convention on August 14, 1968, but the increasing
attention that the AMA and news organizations paid to the organization’s doings. The editorial
indicates that the NMA recognized itself in the wider panoply of medical and civil rights lobbyists,
and that they were addressing their two priorities at the same time.
Although Johnson and the NMA touted Medicare as one of the greatest successes of the era,
not all saw it that way and the impression did not last. Initially, the program doubled the number
retirees covered by health insurance and expedited the desegregation of hospitals.49 However, the
program had several problems. The first major problem related to Medicare’s companion legislation,
the Medicaid program to provide healthcare to the poor. While Kennedy and Johnson had sold
Medicare as a way to provide healthcare to the elderly retired members of society who deserved the
care of a younger generation, the poor were not viewed in the same light. Medicaid operated upon
the same need-tested system that many democrats and (eventually) NMA members found distasteful.
Medicare carried the dignity of retirement; Medicaid carried the stigma of poverty.50
The second problem proved the AMA right, in a sense. Medicare arrived at a time in which
healthcare costs grew rapidly. While a total takeover of the insurance industry would have
standardized costs, Medicare and Medicaid offered a partial solution but also offered the private
insurance industry an incidental opportunity. By removing the poor and the elderly from their
customer base, the legislation absolved private insurance companies of any responsibility for their
most costly customers. Furthermore, the lack of cost controls (which had been removed from the
legislation thanks to AMA lobbying) meant that physicians could bill the Medicare program for
patient treatment in a relatively uncontrolled manner, leading to an increase in costs.51

49

Marilyn Moon, “Medicare Matters: Building on a Record of Accomplishments,” Health Care Financing Review 22,
no. 1 (2000): 10-11.
50
Burnham, Healthcare in America, 324.
51
Burnham, 323.

57
Medicare had been the pinnacle of Johnson’s Great Society, but the Vietnam War usurped it
as the defining feature of his legacy. The rising discontent, civil outrage, and anti-establishment
movements of the late 1960s responded not just to the failure in Vietnam, but reflected growing
frustrations with the slow, stifled progress made by bureaucrats. Although Truman’s conception of
national health care may have been radical by some standards, by the end of the 1960s it was clear
that Medicare was not. The NMA, having accepted the President’s gratitude for their work and
touted their success, had both claimed themselves to be the voice of the Black American patient and
aligned themselves with that method of change. The NMA now contended with two problems. First,
public opinion of Medicare and Medicaid would soon turn, bringing down with it the reputation of
organized medicine. Second, the perceived failures of Johnson’s presidency spawned a variety of
movements that rejected the very basis of the model of care within which the NMA operated.
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Chapter Three
A Time of War—The NMA’s Failure to Produce Emerging Alternatives
In November 1973 the novelist John Oliver Killens published an article in The Black Scholar
titled “Wanted: Some Black Long Distance Runners.” Killens celebrated the achievements of
activist leaders but lamented the brief, intense nature of the recent moments of activism in the Black
community. He thought that revolution could not be won in a matter of months and called the
previous two decades of the civil rights movement a “series of hundred yard dashes with which some
black minds and bodies thought and sought to turn the country around.”1 He hailed the institutionbuilding work of W.E.B. Du Bois as an example of what Black activism should look like. His
people, he argued, needed a stalwart activist institution that could outlast the nearsighted activists
that were au courant at the time. Although Killens mentioned the NAACP, he argued that the
organization had become too devoted to short-term achievements and made almost no mention of Du
Bois’ involvement with its founding.2
The following May, the JNMA published an article written in response to Killens by Wilson
Record, a professor of sociology at Portland State University. Record claimed that the NAACP was
the long-distance runner that Killens sought, briefly pointing to the organization’s legislative
achievements before focusing on the various failures of the myriad short-lived movements and
radical groups. Record also left out any mention of Du Bois in his praise of the NAACP. Although
the two disagreed on the interpretation of the NAACP’s work, they seemed to agree on one thing:
the ground won in the civil rights movement had not adequately ameliorated the problems facing
America’s Black community.
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The choice by the JNMA’s editors to publish Record’s article—which contained no mention
of medicine or healthcare—in the “Integration Battlefront” section demonstrated their commitment
to defend their long-time partner, the NAACP. It was also suggestive of NMA’s ideological
alignment along the spectrum of scholars and activists struggling to end the oppression of African
Americans. The NMA had allied itself with the moderate institutions that had made their name by
working in collaboration with their White counterparts to solve problems within the existing system.
They accepted the essential concept of healthcare as a commodity and sought to end the
discrimination that was responsible for both preventing Black patients from accessing it and sowing
distrust of the system in Black communities.
Up until the end of the 1960s, the NMA had worked with some limited success to occupy
two roles. They served their own interests as professionals, a pursuit that fulfilled the “separate but
equal” model of Black advancement that Washington had proposed at the Atlanta Convention. But
they also made some progress in their capacity as highly educated members of Black society—the
“talented tenth”—to improve the health of Black Americans. However, the NMA wrestled with a
critical problem that came into high relief in the 1970s. They derived their status as members of the
professional class from a privileged position within the very capitalist hierarchy that subjugated a
majority of Black Americans. The NMA had spent decades grasping at the ideal that they could
enjoy both the privilege of a professional identity while servicing the needs of their community as
“race men.” After the passage of Medicare, retiring NMA President Cobb lauded the legislation and
said the NMA had “led the way for the medical profession in advocacy of legislation the people
wanted and which has become law.3 But by the early 1970s, it had become abundantly clear to many
activists that the state was incapable of producing robust solutions to the socioeconomic inequality it
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had created. Those activists would seek alternative models of providing care that would reflect light
over the failings of the existing system.
The healthcare industry and American medicine were not exempt from the tumultuous fallout
of the 1960s. The explosion of dissenting voices increasingly took aim at state institutions. The
dominant victories of the civil rights movement were won not through the deconstruction of
oppressive institutions, but via judicial and legislative reforms of such institutions, such as Brown v.
Board of Education and the 1964 Civil Rights Act. While the era certainly produced several more
radical leaders such as Malcom X and Stokely Carmichael, they provided a foil to the civil rights
movement’s more moderate actors who enjoyed the support of many powerful White allies.4 As the
war in Vietnam became both costly and visually disturbing to Americans, the economy entered a
recession, and distrust in government reached new peaks on both sides of the political divide, health
became another example of the nation’s social problems that the government had failed to address.5
By the early 1970s, popular consensus affirmed that Medicare and Medicaid had failed to
solve the crisis in American healthcare that had emerged a decade earlier. Once again costs reached
new highs and the distribution of quality care remained inequitable. When Nixon proposed a new
system of coverage in 1971, he outlined the problems with the existing system citing the 170 percent
increase in the nation’s healthcare bill since 1960 and the growing share of the cost saddled by the
federal government.6 Medicare and Medicaid programs hemorrhaged money as a result of poor
bureaucratic organization and the compromises made as a result of, among other factors,
negotiations with the medical establishment during the bill’s passage.
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Problems stemmed from the fact that the Medicare program leveraged the existing health
insurance infrastructure of private companies by allowing hospitals to contract with private
insurance companies to perform the administrative duties of Medicare reimbursement.7 The program
established a system in which private insurance companies carried out administrative billing duties
and physicians were allowed to charge “customary and prevailing fees.” This ill-defined mandate
was the result of concerns that uniform costs nation-wide would not account for local variations in
the price of care and that doctors would refuse to participate if they were not granted the freedom to
charge fees for care as they saw fit. Paul Starr called this the “politics of accommodation,” given that
the AMA had threatened to boycott the programs and even the NMA president felt the need to
encourage the organization’s members to serve Medicare patients.8 The accommodations
surrendered to the profession released a lucrative windfall for physicians: spending on medical care
rose twelve percent between 1965 and 1975 and the annual increase in physicians fees rose from
three to six and a half percent.9
Like Medicare, the Medicaid program was also rife with problems. From its inception, the
program required participants to demonstrate their need—a concept that Kennedy had opposed, but
the NMA and Johnson had not. While Johnson pitched Medicare as a way for the nation to provide
dignified care for the retired, he could not make the same pitch for Medicaid, a program that
provided healthcare to the nation’s poor. While Medicare allowed physicians to charge more than
what the program would cover, in an effort to protect participants from the burden of medical debt
Medicaid did not. As a result, not all states participated in the program and the states that did
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participate kept their programs relatively contained.10 The limited scope of the program also meant
that participants often failed to fully grasp how the program worked: in a survey conducted by one
state’s Medicaid program, respondents said that they sometimes lent their Medicaid cards to friends,
fearing that if they did not use the coverage they would lose it.11 While Johnson and the NMA
pitched Medicare as an opportunity to provide for the nation’s deserving retirees, Medicaid did not
enjoy the same support because Americans did not view its impoverished recipients in the same
deserving light as retirees.
By the time that Congress began to consider amendments to the programs in 1970, the NMA
had firmly aligned itself with a physician-first approach to care. The position reflected just how far
the NMA had traveled from the days when they fought the AMA over how best to provide for
patients—by 1970, a majority of the NMA’s members also held AMA membership cards.12 The
Civil Rights Act had forced the AMA to integrate, dissolving the longest-standing disagreement
between the two organizations. The NMA had also grown disillusioned with the state’s abilities to
solve the health disparity. On June 15, 1970, NMA President Dr. Julius Hill testified with AMA
President Dr. Gerald Dorman, marking the first time in history that the two organizations had
presented a joint opinion to Congress.13 Both doctors offered the support of their organizations in
favor of an AMA-devised plan to replace Medicaid called “Medicredit,” and rescinded any nominal
support they had maintained for Medicaid. Hill told the committee:
We supported Medicaid reluctantly. It was hastily drawn and hastily passed. We warned at an
earlier date, and repeated as late as last July to the Secretary of Health, Education, and
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Welfare that Medicaid as currently designed does not really meet the needs of the poor
person who is less then 65 years old.14
The Medicredit program devised by the AMA and backed by the NMA proposed a three-pronged
approach. First, it would have offered a voucher to low-income families that could be spent on
private health insurance on the government’s dime. Second, it would have offered a progressively
scaled tax credit to families to subsidize and incentivize the purchase of healthcare. Third, it
proposed the establishment of a peer-review program in which physicians would monitor one
another’s fees on a regional level. These three plans reflected the professional organizations’ desire
to expand the healthcare marketplace by empowering individual patients financially to act as
consumers of healthcare. Dorman argued that Medicredit would address the existing problems,
which he claimed had been caused by the “rapid, relatively uncontrolled growth of medical
technology, the staggering increase in demand, and the American compulsion to experiment,
innovate, and improvise in the atmosphere of freedom of enterprise and competition of
marketplace.”15
The NMA/AMA-sponsored Medicredit program embodied the response of organized
medicine to the broad increasing state control over their field. It also presented an immediate
alternative amongst a number of other national healthcare proposals. In 1971, Senator Ted Kennedy
(D-MA) partnered with Representative Martha Griffiths (D-MI) to propose the Health Security Act,
which would have enacted a national single-payer health insurance system.16 With Kennedy’s
proposal, the federal government would have provided “cradle to grave” insurance based upon an
expansion of the Medicare program to cover Americans of all ages. Like Medicare and Social
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Security, he proposed funding the program through a 3.5 percent payroll tax and a 2.1 percent tax on
individual income up to $15,000.17
Over the objections of the NMA and the AMA, the Nixon administration also recognized that
the crisis state of the healthcare industry demanded attention. Despite Nixon’s trust in the
conservative credo of limited government, he proposed a relatively state-forward approach titled
“The National Health Insurance Standards Act” to a field crowded with bills offering various
permutations of a national health plan.18 While Nixon’s plan was far more conservative than
Kennedy’s, he proposed the implementation of a mandate that would have required employers to pay
for 65 percent of their employees’ health insurance (the mandate would have increased to 75 percent
within two and a half years), costing the nation’s employers an estimated $2.5 billion ($17.4 billion
adjusted for inflation).19 In introducing his plan, Nixon emphasized the growing role that networks
of providers known as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) should play.
HMOs, according to Nixon, would prove critical in reducing the nation’s healthcare bill
because they reversed the incentive for cost inflation that Medicare and Medicaid had created as a
result of the Johnson administration’s compromises with the AMA. The AMA did not strenuously
object to the bill, however its president testified as to their hesitations on the matter, voicing some
concern that the legislation might limit their sovereignty.20 In an HMO, patients paid a fixed amount
in exchange for services from a network of providers instead of paying physicians a fee for services
rendered. This incentivized providers to reduce costs and cut back on their overhead, rather than
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increase them, which would only diminish their income. “If an HMO is wasteful of time or talent or
facilities, it cannot pass those extra costs on to the consumer or to an insurance company … it is
penalized for going over its budget and rewarded for staying under it,” Nixon told Congress.21 While
HMOs had existed since the 1950s, Nixon intended to facilitate their growth by offering a financial
incentive for providers to switch to this model of care. Nixon ultimately got his way with the passage
of the 1973 Health Maintenance Organization Act, which allocated $375 million over a five-year
period to stimulate the development of HMOs.22
Outside the confines of the Medicare/Medicaid debate, growing encroachment on physicians’
autonomy can explain the NMA’s conservative tack. The demand for consumer protection that
exploded in the 1970s led to increased regulation of not just healthcare costs, but also advertising,
drugs, and technology. “After two decades of increasingly strident attacks and political setbacks,
doctors now had to contend with patients arriving for appointments with Merck Manual [of
Diagnosis and Therapy] in hand,” Tomes wrote of the era.23 Both Democrats and Republicans saw a
need for a national approach to health. Congress passed the HMO act with bipartisan support, and
the NMA was frightened by the relatively expansive role of the federal government in the plans
proposed by even more conservative politicians.
In the 1970 hearings, senators clashed with representatives of the NMA and AMA over the
essential nature of how the healthcare system should be rehabilitated. Working from a report
compiled by the Committee’s staff, members of the Subcommittee on Medicare and Medicaid
confronted Dorman and Hill with the accusation that physicians had viewed the programs as a
seemingly bottomless well of funds and had abused it to point that the programs’ costs became
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unreasonable. Senator Russell Long (D-LA) questioned why the AMA resisted the implementation
of a government review board to monitor Medicare and Medicaid charges, to which the AMA’s
representatives responded that such a plan would interfere with the private physician-patient
relationship. The two physicians also took a defensive tone in response to the Committee’s recent
staff report on the programs. Although both the committee members and representatives of the
professional organizations recognized rising costs as a barrier preventing needy patients from
accessing necessary care, they each placed blame on the other. “It was bitterly ironic. To work 60
and more hours a week in the ghetto, and to be fairly paid was suddenly prima facie evidence of
wrongdoing,” Hill testified, before calling the report “grossly unfair.”24 For a Black physician to
speak of working “in the ghetto” in such terms revealed the class tensions within between the elite
members of the race and their less-privileged counterparts—Hill seemed to align himself more with
his fellow physicians than with his fellow Black Americans.
The crux of Hill’s testimony contended with the inequality in the distribution of care. The
rising cost of healthcare presented a problem, but the NMA saw the lack of physicians in poor, Black
neighborhoods as the primary issue. While the committee’s members sought to keep healthcare costs
in check, Hill argued that any limits on a physician’s income—de jure or de facto—would drive
physicians out of poor neighborhoods and drive young people away from the field. Hill concluded,
“whatever kind of program provides the financial help needed by the poor, the National Medical
Association will oppose any effort to restrict the ability of a physician to provide quality care.”25 The
statement denoted a dramatic shift in the organization’s attitude towards the development of policy.
The NMA’s tone throughout the 1940s reflected a willingness to compromise on certain ideological
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principles of healthcare delivery so long as the conditions of Black patients improved.26 This meant
that they accepted more oversight than they desired because they saw how it would benefit Black
patients. But Hill’s 1970 testimony indicated an updated rhetorical backbone, one that placed the
AMA and the NMA in closer alignment than ever before. While the NMA had once tolerated some
constraints on the practice of medicine, restrictions of any kind were now anathema to their success;
something had changed. Either the NMA’s approach to serving Black patients had evolved, or their
definition of success itself had changed.
By 1970, Simkins v. Cone had eliminated the hospital segregation and the 1964 Civil Rights
Act had ensured legal equality throughout most public institutions. Black physicians had more
opportunity for professional upward mobility than ever before, while the conditions under which
they worked to provide for the underserved Black population were worse. The NMA spent much of
the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s lobbying in support of state solutions to the problems facing Black
patients. By 1970, it had become clear to many healthcare activists that the inequities had to be
addressed on the ground through alternative means. The state remedies—Medicare, Medicaid, and a
graveyard of unpassed legislation—had failed. Instead, activists turned back to grassroots solutions
such as community health programs and free clinics.
The NMA was not ignorant to this fact. The JNMA often ran articles or editorials that voiced
support for various configurations of new approaches to public health. One such editorial, written by
JNMA editor Dr. Clyde Phillips, affirmed the message that healthcare was a right, not a privilege,
and claimed that public hospitals had to be elevated “to their proper role as community health
institutions.”27 But on the very same page, the journal ran the President’s Column, in which he
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inveighed against a recent CBS documentary series that had dealt “disastrous blows” to the
American medical system and proclaimed that “little dichotomy exists between the AMA and the
NMA at this time, and I am impressed that in the not too distant future, that all dichotomy between
these two great organizations will be completely eliminated.”28 While the journal continued to
publish articles—generally written by outside contributors—extolling community health programs,
the opinions reflected in the President’s Column, speeches, and editorials often concluded that more
independence, not more social infrastructure, would yield better results. “Despite our history
regarding cooperation with governmental agencies, we deplore any effort of the federal, state, or
local government which concludes that the problems in our health care delivery mechanism can be
solved simply by bureaucratic gymnastics,” outgoing President Dr. Wiley Armstrong said in 1971.29
The statement reflected the NMA’s endorsement of the principles of professional sovereignty over
the “talented tenth” philosophy.
The NMA’s examination of the worsening crisis in American healthcare led them to
conclude that the nation’s medical professionals were the best agents to reshape the channels through
which Americans obtained healthcare. They sought to do so with the financial support of the federal
government, but nothing more. The NMA also furthered the interests of own members by ensuring
that physicians retained significant control over the price of medical care. Du Bois had warned, “if
we make money the object of man-training, we shall develop money-makers but not necessarily
men.”30 The NMA had brought Du Bois’ prediction to fruition and had left a void in the racial
milieu. The moment presented an opportunity to provide healthcare specifically for Black patients
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without physicians prioritizing their own financial health. But as the NMA had demonstrated, this
was a difficult task to achieve when the competition sought to maximize profits, reenforcing once
again the difficulty of prioritizing both their allegiances to their race and to their profession.
Healthcare had provided the ground upon which activists mobilized well before 1970. While
the NMA had straddled the line of activists and professionals, they always had peers on either side of
them. In the 1920s, some Black physicians (including members of the NMA) embarked upon the
Black Hospital Movement, arguing that the lack of adequate medical facilities for Black patients
could be remedied by building facilities specifically for them.31 The Movement’s participants acted
in response to the sorry state of Black hospitals that aligned with what Washington had described in
calling for a social system in which the Black and White races were “as separate as the fingers, yet
one as the hand.”32 In the 1960s, the NMA continued on the same trajectory, focusing its efforts on
the fight for hospital integration and the passage of Medicare and Medicaid. Meanwhile, other
physicians took a slightly more radical approach. Leaders of the 1963 picket of the AMA convention
and other medical activists formed the Medical Committee for Human Rights (MCHR) in the spring
of 1964. The members of the MCHR, many of whom were White, leftist physicians, saw the surge
of violence in the civil rights movement and predicted a need for medical treatment. They offered
their services to Martin Luther King Jr., who requested their help as the 1964 Freedom Summer
began to heat up.33 The MCHR provided activist-minded physicians with a direct avenue to involve
themselves in the civil rights movement. While NMA president Dr. Leonid Berry lauded their work,
little collaboration existed between the NMA and the MCHR apart from the 1963 picket of the AMA
convention—the ideological core of the two organizations had little overlap. Even as the NMA
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moved closer in alignment with the AMA, the AMA struggled to improve its increasingly negative
image. By 1971, fewer than half the nation’s physicians were AMA members for the first time in
over 50 years, while the MCHR’s membership expanded to over 7,000 doctors.34 This shift indicated
both the fall from grace traditional organized medicine had experienced as well as the growing
popularity of its activist counterpart.
As professional organizations further pursued models of care that centered the physician at
the locus of power, scholars of public health began to recognize the value of community-based care
in a changing society. “Until recently consumer participation has not been consciously seen as a
necessary constituent of a health program,” said Professor of Community Medicine Courtney Wood
said in a speech reprinted in the JNMA.35 Tomes, in characterizing the remade American patient,
joins other scholars of health in noting that by the 1970s, even the poorest patients demanded an
unprecedented level of control and transparency in their care.36 The new American patient was more
discerning, critical, and wary of the high price of medical care. The transformation underway
rebuked the model that the AMA had established (and with which the NMA was increasingly
aligned) in which physicians were fee-for-service providers of a product that their consumers—
patients—could not understand but believed to be a necessity.
The NMA aligned itself with the sorts of systemic reforms that offered little comfort to the
activists who now viewed a radical reimagining of the healthcare system as the only remaining
alternative. The NMA’s fight stayed contained, for the most part, within the walls of Congress and
hotel convention halls. Their participation in the picketing of the AMA convention was as close as
most of the organization’s members got to civil disobedience. The physicians of the MCHR, in
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contrast, used the momentum from the picket to propel the growth of their organization into an
organized radical body of physicians working to reshape the healthcare system. Members of the
MCHR next mobilized at the height of the civil rights movement—they were present for the
violence that occurred at the Edmund Pettus Bridge on Bloody Sunday in Selma, Alabama in March
1965.37 As the violence of the civil rights movement crested to its peak, the MCHR expanded its
mandate to include work with other movements. Historian John Dittmer plots what he calls their
transition from serving as the “medical arm of the civil rights movement to the “medical arm of the
new left.”38 Although the MCHR flanked the NMA on the organization’s political left, the integrated
group of physicians initially still served the interests shared by SNCC and the NMA: legislative
reform. Once that had been achieved, the MCHR would continue to pursue its more radical goals,
leaving the NMA behind as it grew closer to the AMA.
A growing distrust and disillusionment with the state’s ability or willingness to ensure
equality across many sectors of society manifested in the proliferation of new radical activist groups
towards the end of the 1960s. The limited success of Johnson’s Great Society programs paired with
the disastrous war in Vietnam caused widespread disillusionment with the federal government.39 The
perceived failures of the state to address issues of poverty, inequality, and police violence spawned
the inception of the Black Power movement. Inspired by the teachings of Frantz Fanon, Mao
Zedong, and Che Guevara, many radicals not only endorsed the concept of healthcare as a right of
the people, but worked to actualize that vision. Although this conceptualization of health was
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becoming increasingly pervasive across even less radical classes, activists turned the issue into a
touchstone of the new age of activism.
Leaders of the Black Panther Party embodied this trend. Huey Newton and Bobby Seale
founded the party after they developed a close-up critique of the Bay Area Community Action
Program (CAP) at which they worked in the summer of 1966.40 CAPs were the product of the War
on Poverty, which, like Medicare, Medicaid, and Civil Rights Act, had been a part of Johnson’s
attempt to create his Great Society. But to Newton and Seale, these programs signified the lack of
cohesion and inefficacy of the state response to problems stemming from the oppressive nature of
capitalism.41 They believed that the programs failed to reach an adequate audience and, on an
ideological level, viewed them as an enabler of the racial oppression that they had realized was
integral to the functioning of capitalism. The Party sought to establish alternatives to these
ineffectual state solutions. Although images of Panthers clad in leather jackets and black berets
carrying pump-action shotguns garnered attention and earned them popular notoriety, their
willingness to engage in violent struggle characterized only a part of their larger mission. The
leaders of the BPP—which was first named the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense but
subsequently dropped the latter part of the name—created a party platform predicated upon ending
the oppression of the Black diaspora. The party’s initial “Ten-Point Program,” released upon the
party’s inception in October 1966, detailed a list of demands and actions that party leaders sought.
The third point read, “We Want An End To The Robbery By The Capitalists Of Our Black
Community.”42 The ideological basis of the program drew heavily upon the ideas of revolutionaries
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such as Mao and Fanon, while its concrete demands made direct references to the American
Declaration of Independence and Constitution.43 The BPP effectively weaponized the everyday
oppression of Black Americans by weaving political ideology into every aspect of their work.
Pickup sites for free shoes were adorned with images of Che Guevara, the party raised funds by
selling copies of Mao’s Little Red Book, and bags of free groceries were often stamped with
socialist rhetoric.
The BPP proved remarkably effective at producing tangible outcomes. By 1969, the Party
was providing free breakfast to over 20,000 kids each week via their free breakfast program, which
they had opened in nineteen locations.44 The party gave away thousands of bags of groceries, free
shoes and clothing, and provided basic domestic services to community members.45 Healthcare
naturally fit into the BPP’s agenda—it was the site of both widespread discrimination against Black
Americans and a fundamental human right in this vision of a society. As Alondra Nelson points out,
the revolutionaries from which Newton and Seale drew inspiration specifically discussed health as
the site of revolution, and Fanon and Guevara were themselves physicians.46 The alignment of
American identity and consumerism (and the folding of healthcare into that consumerism) explained
the Panthers’ turn to both Black nationalism and a socialist model of healthcare. If patients, as
consumers, purchased their way into an American identity, as Tomes and Cohen posit, the Panthers
rejected not only the concept that healthcare was a product accessible only to those who could afford
it, but also the national identity to which consuming healthcare tethered the patient.
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Free healthcare not only aligned with the Party’s ideological foundation, but it addressed one
of the major effects of systemic racism in America. In 1975, neurologist Richard Restak wrote in a
New York Times column that, “when left to their own devices biomedical scientists are capable of
some rather nasty mischief indeed. We are learning the hard way that science is not neutral; it is not
concerned solely with ‘truth.’”47 He was referring, in part, to the infamous study in Tuskegee,
Alabama in which some 430 Black syphilis patients were left untreated in a study run by the Public
Health Service in order to examine the effects of untreated syphilis. Although the study remains
amongst the most well-known and probably most egregious instances of institutional violence
perpetuated by the public health apparatus, the Tuskegee study was only one such instance among a
variety of alarming widespread practices. Racism was pervasive throughout not just the public health
apparatus as a body, but clinical encounters as well. While more Black doctors worked in hospitals
than ever before thanks to the desegregation work of the NMA and the civil rights movement, racism
in clinic settings remained a driving force behind the desire for alternatives to the established system.
The BPP’s clinics could serve not only as this alternative, but also as a dissemination site for the
party’s message and incubators of political thought—visitors might receive an invitation to a
political education class in addition to whatever treatment they sought.48
While early members of the BPP were young revolutionaries with sharpened social
mobilization skills, they were more adept with rifles than with stethoscopes. As the physicians of the
MCHR began looking for alternative paths to systemic change post-1964, the burgeoning BPP was a
logical partner. For the physicians who had founded the MCHR in 1964, their mission to provide
medical care where it was most needed in the civil rights movement took precedent over other
considerations. The political alignment of the organization’s members ran the gamut from card-
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carrying communists to those who supported the civil rights movement but did not necessarily
endorse as radical of an approach as the Communist Party advocated.49 The MCHR demonstrated to
the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) that free clinics could provide one avenue to address the
worsening state of American healthcare, and the office funded hundreds of such clinics.50 The
MCHR decision to pursue both free clinics and national reform signaled their understanding that
community health programs offered little more than a stopgap measure to address holes in the
system created by the piece-meal type approach of Medicare and Medicaid. While such programs
proved effective in administering preventative and low-level care, they could not perform the sorts
of major procedures that bankrupted low and even middle-class families. However, free clinics could
weaponize the care they did provide as a tool for change. In the early 1960s, SNCC enlisted the help
of the MCHR—providing that help fulfilled the MCHR’s paramount mission. But their ideological
alignment lay to the left of both SNCC and the NMA—the MCHR sought radical systemic change.
By 1970, the organization had entered the fight for universal healthcare in the form of a full-page
advertisement in the New York Times attacking the AMA and advocating that “HEALTH IS A
HUMAN RIGHT.”51 Their work took two forms. First, they proposed their own program to provide
healthcare to all Americans. While the Kennedy proposal ticked most of their boxes, they still took
opposition to it on the basis that it was funded in a regressive manner.52 Second, the organization
continued to provide medical treatment to activists in need. They did so by providing on-the-ground
medical care at protests throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, as well as through their work at
various free healthcare clinics.
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By the time the Panthers approached the MCHR, the physicians had already begun work to
establish several free clinics. The robust social network that the Panthers had created as a result of
their other community programs meant that they had a clear vision of the shape the clinics would
take, how they would serve the people, and what needs they would address.53 The clinics, which the
party named the “People’s Free Medical Clinics,” (PFMCs) had begun to open in major cities by the
end of the 1960s. Seale ordered that they become an organization-wide requirement by 1970 and by
1973, the Panthers had opened PFMCs across thirteen cities from Oakland to New York.54 The
clinics were equipped with exam rooms, staffed by volunteer physicians of all races, and provided
basic health checkups, STD testing, and, critically, testing for sickle cell anemia.
In 1972, the BPP formally added healthcare to their ten-point plan. While the NMA had
always parsed their language when it came to how best to provide healthcare for Black Americans,
the BPP did not:
We Want Completely Free Health Care For All Black And Oppressed People: We believe
that the government must provide, free of charge, for the people, health facilities which will
not only treat our illnesses, most of which have come about as a result of our oppression, but
which will also develop preventive medical programs to guarantee our future survival.55
The PFMCs did not embody the fulfillment of this demand—they provided an immediate response
to what the party saw as a dire and worsening situation in the health of Black Americans. In the
Panthers’ eyes, this problem could not be solved through the expansion or amendment of the existing
state programs with which many Black patients had a less than positive relationship. The NMA, in
contrast, pursued exactly such a solution by partnering with the AMA to propose a system of
individual insurance with which patients would seek care in the existing system.
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Instead, the PFMCs offered an alternative to the existing medical system and allowed the
Panthers to stage their own vision of Black society. Research and testing for sickle cell anemia
provided ample ground upon which the Party could further its mission. The fatal genetic disease was
poorly understood, disproportionately affected the Black community, and received little attention
from the White medical establishment. The party advertised the PFMCs and their testing services in
their newspaper, The Black Panther, often linking the treatment to a larger political message. “YOU
CAN HELP DESTROY ONE OF THE ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT BLACK GENOCIDE—FIGHT
SICKLE CELL ANEMIA,” read one advertisement. 56 Copies of The Panther, the proceeds of
which were used to purchase medical supplies to stock clinics, were adorned with headings that
included images of Guevara (among other revolutionary leaders), as well as references to “the
people’s fight.” In addition to the images and language that remain emblematic of socialist
movements, Panther publications routinely referred to the lack of research and attention paid to
sickle cell as “genocidal,” “racist,” and as part of a “dehumanizing medical system.”57 Summed up
succinctly by a young volunteer, “[Sickle cell testing] was more than just a service—it was an
organizing tool.”58
The PFMCs also aided the BPP in the construction of a Black community. Future Party
Chairwoman Elaine Brown told Nelson that “we decided as an organization that we had to take
precautions regarding disease, we couldn’t afford to have disease in the community.”59 This led the
party to develop public “freeze lists” containing the names of Party members who were receiving
treatment for STDs. The clinics, staffed entirely by volunteers using primarily donated supplies,
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provided primarily immediate care for a variety of basic health problems. They were, by definition,
an alternative to the existing government-funded health system. Party leadership emphasized this last
point in communicating their disapproval for clinics that sought government funding, fearing that
said clinics would lose their independence.60
Most of the PFCMs closed by the 1980s as the BPP fell victim to the FBI’s targeted attacks.
They were not a viable alternative to the existing healthcare system. But the void they filled at the
time and the legacy they left nonetheless highlights a significant fracture in the American healthcare
system. Not only did their labor prompt further research into sickle cell anemia and provide a model
of effective community-based healthcare, but it demonstrated, yet again, a need for a new approach
to healthcare in America. Their brief success offers less of an exemplary alternative to the solutions
pursued by the NMA, but rather a reference point to which the NMA’s endorsement of the
Medicredit program can be compared. The NMA’s proposal supposedly empowered the individual,
while the BPP emphasized the collective. The central role of healthcare in the Panthers’ socialist
Black Power agenda reflected the ways in which the American healthcare system failed Black
Americans. And as demonstrated by their allyship with the AMA and their joint Medicredit
proposal, the NMA had ceased to resist that system, but instead became a maintenance worker
within it.
By 1974, concern over rising healthcare costs were so widespread that it appeared that the
passage of national healthcare plan was inevitable. The Nixon Administration, trying to outflank
Congressional Democrats Mills and Kennedy on their right, even spearheaded the effort in proposing
the Comprehensive Health Insurance Program (CHIP), which would have provided funds for system
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of employer-governmental funded comprehensive healthcare on a voluntary basis.61 The plan
appeared slated for success, but Nixon’s resignation fatally halted its progress. However, the
moment of rare unity on the issue may have signaled that the fracture that split open the debate in
1970 could nonetheless have yielded an enormous change in American healthcare policy had
Nixon’s presidency not fallen apart. Decades later, Kennedy, who had tried to negotiate a singlepayer alternative to the Nixon’s CHIP plan, famously reflected that perhaps he had missed his last
opportunity to pass a national health plan. "We should have jumped on that,” Kennedy said.62
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Conclusion
A Time to Gather Stones Together—The Political Legacy of Healthcare and Race
In April 2006, MIT held a conference to discuss the implications of race-based drugs. The
conference’s organizers sought to specifically explore the implications of a new drug named BiDil.
BiDil was intended to treat congestive heart failure in African American patients, a demographic that
suffers disproportionately from the condition. It was the first drug approved by the FDA for the
treatment of a specific race. For a short time, its invention seemed not just like a new page in the
story of medicine and race, but an entirely new book. But that book was not to be—instead, BiDil’s
story would become a vignette in the lengthy history of racial tension within the medical field. In
this paper, I chose to focus on what I view as the central cause of that tension: the intersection of
medical professionalism and race.
The physicians of the NMA struggled to balance their allegiance to their fellow Black
Americans with their desire to maintain the sovereignty they came to enjoy as members of a
privileged class of professionals. Their decision to align with positions and groups that sought to
maintain physicians’ professional sovereignty at various key moments resulted in the preservation of
the prestige—and financial rewards—to which physicians had become accustomed. The NMA had
to make such a decision because the positions of “race man” and “physician” lay so far apart that
they could not successfully occupy both identities, although it appeared for a period as though this
might be possible. It seemed as though BiDil might change that.
Supporters of the drug—of which there were many—saw it as an example of how the
entrepreneurial spirit could affect positive change.1 Finally, it appeared as though advancements in
the medical field would benefit Black patients rather than harming them, as centuries of false racial
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science and unethical experimentation had done. Perhaps the freedom enjoyed by the medical
establishment was now doing the work of “race men.” However, the drug’s early critics were
cautious that it would reenforce a false understanding of biological race. Scholar Dorothy Roberts
was one such critic.
At the MIT conference, Roberts told the crowd that there was no consensus among African
Americans on the efficacy of race-based therapeutics such as BiDil.2 The pharmaceutical arrived on
the market with a bark in 2005 but quickly left without so much as a whimper. Despite analysts’
projection that the drug would garner annual sales of $500 million or more, it was an unequivocal
failure. Some physicians were skeptical of its use given the dubious conception of race upon which
the drug’s development had been based. Its creator, Dr. Jay Cohn. also blamed poor marketing and
insurance issues for the inability of physicians to overcome what Cohn saw as a prejudice against a
race-based drug. Under the pressure of increasing deficits and disappointing sales, NitroMed (the
company that owned BiDil) sold its patents and stock of the drug in 2009. Though the drug remains
on the market, its patents expired in September 2020.3 However, at the time of Roberts’ speech, the
drug was still being heralded as a major achievement in the fight for racial equity.
Roberts’ skepticism was well-founded. Cohn had not developed the drug specifically for
Black patients. He had combined two vasodilators often used to treat congestive heart failure into
one fixed dose of both drugs, but when the FDA rejected the initial request for approval, Cohn went
back and conducted a trial that contained only self-selecting African Americans subjects.4 This
meant he had proven that the drug worked, but said nothing about how, why, or even whether it
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worked especially well in African Americans. The BiDil trial, formally named the African American
Heart Failure Trial (A-HeFT), was no different than trials of other drugs in which mostly white
participants test drugs that are not marketed as “drugs for white people.”5
As Roberts spoke, the President of the New England chapter of the NAACP stood up in the
audience and disagreed with her, listing off the organizations united in support of BiDil (including
the NAACP). “Young lady, you are jeopardizing the lives of black people,” he told her.6 After some
investigation, Roberts revealed that the NitroMed, the company that held the BiDil patent, had
partnered with the NAACP and given them a three-year $1.5 million grant in exchange for the
organization’s vigorous promotion of the drug. NAACP was not the only organization advocating
Black patients to endorse BiDil, nor was it the only one to accept money from NitroMed. The
National Minority Health Month Foundation accepted money, as did the Association of Black
Cardiologists, and the NMA endorsed the drug.7 The NMA’s president told the Associated Press, “It
is our hope that BiDil will be brought to market as quickly as possible to enhance its life saving
impact. Any day of delay represents an unacceptable missed opportunity to save lives.”8 As usual,
NMA members were not in complete agreement; its journal carried a number of articles expressing
the diverse array of perspectives on BiDil.9 However, the endorsement of the organization’s
president amongst a field of powerful actors is nonetheless telling.
The physicians of the NMA offer a particularly complex case study of the gnawing tension
between the health-related needs of patients and the financial interests of their physicians. These two
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interests did not oppose one another, but the added burden of operating within the racism of
twentieth century America clarified that the health needs of the public at-large and the professional
desires of individual physicians do not always align. The element of race accentuates the pervasive
issues within the existing healthcare delivery model. It also complicates the narrative of medical
professional sovereignty by simultaneously placing Black physicians at the metaphorical “top” and
“bottom” of two overlapping classes (Black Americans and Black physicians). By focusing on race,
I have rhetorically leveraged the scholarship performed by Du Bois and his contemporaries to reveal
the festering core issue of a system in which physicians are not necessarily incentivized to take the
action that would best benefit the most patients. By offering a model of care that conceded nothing
to the sovereign professional, the Black Panther Party shone a light on the deep chasm that lay
between these two interests, implicating the NMA in the process.
While the NMA pursued legislative reforms in the 1940s that would have, arguably, fulfilled
their duties as race men, the powerful influence of the AMA effectively forced them to relinquish
their position. When the momentum of the civil rights movement and the backing of a determined
executive branch offered the NMA the opportunity to (partially) fulfill the mission they had begun in
1945, it was concessions made to the AMA in the interest of professional sovereignty that destined
Medicare and Medicaid for failure. The NMA’s response to that failure—and the short-lived
alternative explored by the Panthers—consecrated professional sovereignty as the dominant
ideology.
An editorial by then-President of the NMA, Dr. Oliver Brooks, appeared in the June 2020
issues of the JNMA in which he compared the murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police
officer in May of 2020 to an autoimmune disorder. He argued that officers overreacted to a minor
threat inciting widespread disarray and violence that threatened society as a whole, much in the way
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that an autoimmune disease incites in immune response to an antigen-presenting cell that damages
the host. “The injury is to the whole of society; no one and nothing is spared,” Brooks wrote of
Floyd’s murder.10 He concluded that police brutality against Black bodies and racial health inequities
are both symptoms of the same social disease: the systemic oppression of Black Americans. To
borrow a simile from Booker T. Washington, the two symptoms are, perhaps, separate as fingers yet
one as the hand.
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